Essays on model uncertainty and corporate financial policies by Liu, Zhun







A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/94844  
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 















































Submitted to the University of Warwick





List of Tables iii




Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 One Approximation of Real-world Corporate Financing
Decisions 8
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.1 In the classic expected utility setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2 In the prospect theory setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.3 Discussion on No-arbitrage Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Formal Model Setting and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.1 The Properties of Equilibria with Weighted Probability . . . . 32
2.5 Conclusions and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6.1 Appendix: The Equilibriums under EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6.2 Appendix: The Equilibria in High Prospect Economy . . . . . 40
2.6.3 Appendix: The Equilibria in Low Prospect Economy . . . . . 43
Chapter 3 The Role of Model Uncertainty in Corporate Risk Man-
agement 46
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
i
3.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.1 Parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.2 Numerical solution and simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5 Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.7.1 Appendix:Numerical Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.7.2 Appendix:Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Chapter 4 Profitability Uncertainty and Corporate Risk Manage-
ment 93
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3.1 Parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3.2 Numerical solution and simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4 Conclusion and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.5 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5.1 Appendix:Numerical Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5.2 Appendix:Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Chapter 5 Concluding Remarks 126
ii
List of Tables
3.1 Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2 Simulation results of baseline models with no model uncertainty . . . 81
3.3 H vs L, with cash, no model uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.4 H vs L, with model uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.5 Effect of learning, H-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.6 Effect of learning, L-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.7 Marginal effect of risk management tools, H-type . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.8 Marginal effect of risk management tools, L-type . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.9 Value Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.1 Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.2 Simulation results of baseline models, H-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.3 Simulation results of baseline models, L-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4 H vs L, with cash, no model uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.5 Effect of learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.6 Marginal effect of risk management tools, H-type . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.7 Marginal effect of risk management tools, L-type . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
iii
List of Figures
2.1 Time Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 The Indifference Curve for the Entrepreneur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 The Probability Weighting Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 The Pooling Equilibrium When Market Is Risky . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 The Pooling Equilibrium When Market Is Less Risky . . . . . . . . . 27
2.6 The Binomial Tree of Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7 The Zero Profit-Line for the Financier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1 Comparison between H and L type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.2 Effect of model uncertainty: Average, H-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3 Effect of model uncertainty: Average, L-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4 Marginal effects: H-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5 Marginal effects: L-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.1 Comparison between H and L type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.2 Effect of model uncertainty: Average, H-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.3 Effect of model uncertainty: Average, L-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.4 Marginal effects: H-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.5 Marginal effects: L-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
iv
Acknowledgments
My four years as a PhD student in Warwick Business School was full of challenges
and the joy of conquering these challenges. The accomplishment of this thesis has
only been possible due to the help and support that I have received from my super-
visors, fellow students, family and other inspiring scholars.
First and foremost, I must express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor,
Dr. Andrea Gamba. It is fair to say that without his generous help. I would not be
able to switch to such a mathematics-intensive field - dynamic corporate finance - in
the last two years of my Ph.D. pursuit. Beyond what a normal supervisor would do
for his/her student, he passed to me the most precious inheritance - the rigorousness
as an academic scholar. His sharp perspective always inspires me to look over the
surface and grasp the essence. His critics are usually right into the point and after
years, I have learned to approach my research in the same manner. It is my great
honour to have him as my supervisor.
Dr. Lei Mao provided me with many useful advices on my first paper. He is
so clever a person but readily to share his wisdom. He is also a thoughtful and kind
person, especially when I was in financial distress during my Ph.D. pursuit. I have
learned from him that a successful academic is both intelligent and diligent, as I
witnessed him sleeping in office over many nights. This also spurs me to concentrate
more on my own research.
I owe many thanks to Dr. Kostas Koufopoulos, who was my original super-
visor in the first year. His research interest inspired my first paper. When I had
v
some difficulty, he is the kind of person who could sit down with you for hours just
to make your mind clear. He might be straightforward in inter-person skills, but no
one could deny he is a very serious person when we talk about academic.
I should also thank Dr. Alok Kumar, who was a part-time professor from the
US, but opened my eye view to the world. His lectures are interesting and partially
inspired my first paper too. His faith on me have encouraged to keep on pursuing
the Ph.D. degree during my hard time in the second and third year. Dr. April
Klein is a kind woman who always reminds me the humanity part of a scholar. Her
academic perspective are practical but also valuable. Dr. Peter Corvi helped me
most in forming up my teaching philosophy. He won the latest teaching award of
the university. In hope of being a professor like him, I earned my teaching certificate
during my Ph.D. and is now an Associate Fellow of the Higher Education Academy.
Dr. Michael Moore, as the head of our Ph.D. programme, and Ms. Nicki
Pegg, as the departmental secretary has offered me the most helpful support in my
academic and financial trough. My fellow Ph.D. students, Yao Chen, Harold Contr-
eras Munoz, Anastasios Maligkris, Cheng-yu Yang, Ali Osseiran, and Juan Carpio
among others, are the best bonus during my Ph.D. pursuit. We encouraged each
other and together built up the best memory in our best time of life.
At last, I should particularly thank my parents and grandparents for sup-
porting my irresponsible decision for pursuing the Ph.D. degree after having been
working for three years. Their best wish on me was having a family at that moment.
Especially my grandparents, I always understand their wish of seeing my own child
before they are gone. I am so sorry for my selfish academic pursuit and sincerely
hope my success will bring them a little comfort. Finally, my thoughts go to my
girlfriend Sonya Liu. In the past two years, she was the final person that I could
count on when I was studying here half an earth away from home. She accompanied
me through all the ups and downs. Although we are temporarily separated due to
individual pursuit in academic, my heart is always with her.
vi
Declarations
I declare that any material contained in this thesis has not been submitted for a
degree to any other university. I further declare that Chapters 3 and 4 of the this





The thesis comprises three essays on model uncertainty and corporate financial
policies. Particularly, it studies how model uncertainty affects firm’s choice in financing
method in distinct market conditions, as well as the evolution of corporate risk manage-
ment policy under resolving uncertainty in firm’s profitability and the ability to hedge
with derivatives.
Chapter 2 is the first attempt to reconcile prospect theory and contract theory
in explaining observed financing decisions. In a world of ambitious and aggressive eco-
nomic agents, even original equilibria break down in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion. When the aggressiveness in the market prevails, multi-pooling-equilibria could exist,
which might explain why academics cannot find the optimal leverage. In the meanwhile,
debt issuance will be lower, which sheds light on the distinct liquidity provision patterns
between bull and bear markets. Firms with lottery-like investment opportunity will get
external financing more easily than that with safe projects because both market partic-
ipants - entrepreneur and financier – will perceive the project to be more valuable than
would otherwise be suggested by the classical expected utility theory.
While current corporate risk management theories predict that young firms should
hedge more than the established ones, the claim is not supported by empirical observa-
tions, which also present mixed evidence on whether hedging creates value. Chapter 3
attempts to address this puzzle by including model uncertainty as part of risk management
process. We develop a dynamic model in which agents learn about a firm’s hedgeability,
gauged by the correlation between its operating cash flow and underlying asset of hedging
instruments, while weighing the costs and benefits of different risk management tools.
The model predicts that resolving model uncertainty accelerates the process of building
up hedging positions, but this is not necessarily accompanied with firm value creation. We
conclude that dynamic information acquisition is an important determinant of corporate
risk management.
In Chapter 4, we develop a dynamic model of corporate risk management in which
agents learn about a firm’s profitability and balance the costs and benefits of risk man-
agement. We depict how the resolution of this particular model uncertainty intertwines
with corporate risk management policy. The model predicts that both cash balance and
hedging level increase in profitability prospects. We conclude that unraveling profitability
drives distinct dynamics in corporate cash management and hedging policy, as a result
of trade-off between risk-managing consideration and default option value-maximization.
This also yields insights into the puzzles of why young firms use less hedging than mature





Corporate financial policies crucially depend on underlying assumptions made by
decision makers. However, these assumptions are usually associated with a great
deal of uncertainty. The uncertainty includes the model itself, which governs the
cash flow of a firm, as well as the parameters assumed in the model. In this regard,
any analysis on the effectiveness of corporate financial policy should allow for some
uncertainty regarding the underlying model. Therefore, this thesis comprises three
essays, with each focusing on a particular type of uncertainty. Chapter 2 studies a
firm’s choice of financing methods facing two layers of uncertainty in a world where
agents follow Prospect Theory preference. Chapter 3 and 4 focus on dynamic cor-
porate risk management policy given unravelling uncertainty in model parameters.
The uncertainty in Chapter 3 is about the correlation between a firm’s cash flow and
hedging asset, while in Chapter 4 the uncertainty is in the firm’s profitability.
Recently, successful attempts have been made applying Prospect Theory, pro-
posed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and advanced in Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), to asset pricing theories. For example, Barberis and Huang (2008) show that
the theory could help price skewness and thus shed light on the equity premium puz-
zle. Yet its application to corporate finance is rather under-studied, especially in the
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field of financing decision theory. Chapter 2 presents the first attempt to reconcile
the ongoing debate on the distinct choices in corporate financing methods in bull
and bear markets using Prospect Theory preference.
Both of the two classic theories on corporate financing decisions, namely trade-
off theory and pecking order theory (Myers, 1984), are confronted with counter-
evidence. Fama and French (2002) find more profitable firms are less levered, which
contradicts trade-off theory. Both Jung et al. (1996) and Frank and Goyal (2003),
however, find that firms issue equity when they should issue debt as predicted by the
pecking order theory. Although modern research using more complicated dynamic
models, such as Goldstein et al. (2001), Hennessy and Whited (2005), and Gomes
and Schmid (2010), are able to explain certain stylised facts, their specific model
structures cannot offer a general model that could accommodate all the puzzles.
This gap in the literature motivated the analysis discussed in Chapter 2. In
this analysis, I show that facing uncertainties in the characteristics of a firm and the
proportion of each type of firm, a simple, static model based on Prospect Theory
can shed light on many stylised facts or puzzles that are not yet resolved.
Methodologically, I develop a parsimonious game-theoretic model in which
adverse selection concern is involved. In this model, a firm knows its type, either
’good’ or ’bad’ as in Myers (1984) or ’risky’ or ’safe’ as in Brennan and Kraus (1987).
Additionally, external investors must learn the information from observing the firm’s
choice of financing method. In a Prospect Theory world, all the economic agents tend
to overweight small probability events and underweight moderate to large probability
events. This distortion is more severe when multiple layers of uncertainty exist, as
presented in this essay. Alternatively, the distortion in perceived probability changes
with the aggressiveness of individual investors, which is governed by the parameter
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γ in the probability weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
As suggested by much empirical research, this parameter fluctuates with the bull –
bear market cycle. As a result, subtle and complex trade-offs in the model set-up
give rise to multiple equilibria and yield many interesting implications.
I find that both the original equilibria in Myers (1984) and Brennan and
Kraus (1987) are no longer upheld in this world. The single equilibrium they found
breaks down into a spectrum of multiple equilibria or a combination of both a single
equilibrium and multiple equilibria. I find support for the stylised fact that firms
tend to issue more equity securities than debt in a bull market, and vice versa in a
bear market. This finding results from firms’ choice of when to pool together to hide
information from external investors and when to separate from each other in order
not to further frustrate them. Firms with more lottery-like investment opportuni-
ties would more easily raise external capital as both parties in the financing game
perceive them to be more valuable. Consequently, positive NPV projects might be
forgone and negative NPV projects might be carried out. Market value in the short-
term could thus be distorted; what is worse, this distortion could be enhanced by
self-fulfilment leading to a larger value correction in the future when the uncertainty
is resolved. These consequences invite interesting future research along this path.
We study the effect of uncertainty, especially the dynamic effect resulting from
its resolution, more explicitly in Chapter 3 and 41. We concentrate our focus on cor-
porate risk management policy, in which the whole emphasis is on uncertainty by its
very nature. Academics have put tremendous efforts into understanding why and
how a firm should manage its total risk. From a classic point of view, firms should
leave the trouble to individual owners, as they could diversify away the idiosyncratic
part of risk while the systematic part of risk should be fairly priced in the market.
1co-authored with Dr. Andrea Gamba
3
In this regard, corporate risk management will not create any value and therefore
firms should neither hedge using derivatives, nor retain cash for precautionary pur-
poses. However, Guay and Kothari (2003)’s data show that 57% firms world-wide
routinely use derivatives . Bates et al. (2009) also documented an average cash ratio
of 23.2% in 2006, an increase from 10.5% in 1980, mostly for precautionary motive.
This empirically derived evidence is at odds with classic corporate risk management
theory.
Advanced theories on corporate risk management have identified several pos-
sible explanations for the observed heavy use of corporate risk managing tools. Smith
and Stulz (1985) showed that both the purpose to reduce expected costs of financial
distress and the purpose to lower the expected taxes in the presence of a convex
tax schedule could provide incentives for firms to actively manage their risk. Froot
et al. (1993) added that corporate risk management could prevent firms from costly
external financing costs by better aligning internal cash flow with a new project’s
financing needs. Thus, convex structures underlying their cost functions justify the
use of risk management devices in order to maximise a firm’s value. Neverthe-
less, while confirming the substantial usage of derivatives and cash, recent empirical
studies find mixed evidence on a firm’s value created by corporate risk management.
One school of scholars find supporting results, such as Allayannis and Weston (2001),
Graham and Rogers (2002), Carter et al. (2006), MacKay and Moeller (2007), and
Campello et al. (2011). Another school, however, disagree with this observation;
their results show either non-significant evidence or even value-destroying evidence
(Brown, 2001; Guay and Kothari, 2003; Jin and Jorion, 2006; Magee, 2009; Bartram
et al., 2011).
Another puzzle in corporate risk management is that traditional corporate
risk management theory predicts young firms, which are usually associated with
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more risk, should make greater use of risk management tools than mature firms. In
contrast, the observed hedgers are usually large firms (Nance et al., 1993). More-
over, hedging increases with firm size (Graham and Rogers, 2002). Bartram et al.
(2009) also find that there is little relevance between young firms’ amount of hedge
and financial distress.
We note that these theories do not leave room for model uncertainty. This
missing piece is indeed helpful in explaining certain documented stylised facts in cor-
porate finance, especially in a dynamic fashion. For example, Moyen and Platikanov
(2013) develop a model under a dynamic Tobin’s q framework in which a firm’s
quality is uncertain. Shareholders update their belief based on the quality. These
authors find that firms involving more uncertainty are more sensitive to earnings
when they make investment decisions. De´camps et al. (2015) introduce uncertainty
into a firm’s profitability and find that both target cash ratio and dividend payout
ratio increase with the firm’s profitability prospects. Uncertainty in profitability is
also investigated in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2016), based on a dynamic moral haz-
ard model. They find that young and mature firms choose distinct policies when
terminating investment projects and issuing dividend payouts.
The methodology employed in Chapter 3 and 4 is different from that in Chap-
ter 2, due to its dynamic nature. Since we focus our research question on the relation-
ship between the evolution of corporate risk management policy and the resolution
of model uncertainty, a dynamic risk management model is an appropriate selection.
Mello et al. (1995) initiate this strand of literature. They find that corporate hedg-
ing policy endogenises with flexibility in production. This structural relationship
is also greatly affected by agency costs. This methodology subsequently becomes
popular and has achieved great success ever since2. Our model most closely relates
2with notable studies such as Gamba and Triantis (2008); Rampini and Viswanathan (2010); Bolton
et al. (2011); Rampini and Viswanathan (2013); Bolton et al. (2014); Gamba and Triantis (2014);
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to that outlined by Gamba and Triantis (2014). We set off from a very parsimonious
model, where shocks to a firm’s cash flow and to the price of the underlying asset
of a derivative are governed by a risk-neutral, multivariate autoregressive process.
Firms could retain cash from realised cash flows. The return on internal cash is
lower than the risk-free rate, resulting in costly cash reserves. Firms are allowed to
hedge their cash flow risks using derivatives in the face of external financing costs,
as the two variables are correlated. In Chapter 3, we assume there is uncertainty
in the correlation, whereas in Chapter 4 the long-term mean of a firm’s cash flow is
assumed to be uncertain.
As mentioned previously, the meaning of managing risk with hedge relies cru-
cially on the correlation between hedged and hedging assets. Thus, any analysis of
the effectiveness of corporate risk management should be based on the assumption
of this correlation, which we later refer to as ’hedgeability’. In Chapter 3, we study
the case in which the correlation is disguised with some uncertainty. Agents do not
know the true value of correlation parameter but could learn from observing realised
cash flows and price movement of the underlying asset of the derivative. We find
that resolution of uncertainty in hedgeability accelerates the process of building up
hedging positions. This acceleration is magnified when cash reserves are also allowed
in the model. This might help answer the open question why young firms hedge less
than the mature ones. While we show that both hedging and cash reserves are in-
dispensable as a risk management tool, the relationship between them could be both
substitutionary and complementary. Moreover, we show that despite significantly
different choices in risk management tools, hedge or cash, the difference in firm value
could be very small under reasonable assumptions. The value created by managing
risk might be lost in the decreasing value of a default option. This finding is consis-
tent with empirical research, where they document the extensive use of hedge and
Rampini et al. (2014); Nikolov et al. (2015)
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cash but show mixed evidence in firm value creation.
Inspired by an emerging strand in the literature on uncertainty in profitability,
Chapter 4 studies corporate cash holding policy and hedging policy in the presence
of resolving uncertainty in a firm’s profitability. We find that both the firm’s hedg-
ing level and cash balance increase with improved profitability prospects. However,
low profitability firms have different risk management policies than those of more
profitable ones. This is because optimal corporate risk management policy results
from the trade-off between maximising the value created by risk management and
minimising losses in the value from the default option. In addition, we find that
resolution of uncertainty in profitability enhances the substitutionary effect between
cash reserves and hedging, although a complementary effect co-exists.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the findings and potential
contribution of this thesis, and discusses future research areas.
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Chapter 2
One Approximation of Real-world
Corporate Financing Decisions
2.1 Introduction
Ever since the axiomatization of the Expected Utility Theory provided by Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1944), the manner in which individuals make decisions
under uncertainty has long been in debate. Some “paradoxes” and anomalies, which
are inconsistent with the Expected Utility Theory, have gradually been uncovered
in both experiments and the real world. In the meanwhile, remarkable progress has
been made in exploring non-expected utility theories, such as subjective expected
utility theory (Savage, 1954), prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), max-
imax expected utility theory, minimum regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982),
rank-dependent expected utility theory (Quiggin, 1982, 1993), Choquet expected
utility theory (Schmeidler, 1989), and maximin expected utility theory (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1989). All of the above are used to explain the “anomalies” which have
been difficult to reconcile in the classic expected utility theory. Within them, the
prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (and later upgraded
to the cumulative prospect theory in Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) has received
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the most attention because of its capacity to capture a large variety of documented
anomalies, its mathematical tractability, its close relation with the traditional ex-
pected utility theory and its compatibility with other non-expected utility theories
such as maximin utility theory, which could enable the compound theory to explain
ambiguity aversion. It therefore introduces us a whole new framework in explaining
individual’s decision process and yields more realistic predictions across many disci-
plines. This paper examines its particular application in finance. Notably, although
some ground-breaking progress has been made in asset pricing theory, Barberis and
Huang (2008) - for instance, proving that the combination of cumulative prospect
theory and capital asset pricing model (CAPM) may also price skewness and so shed
light on the negative average excess return puzzle and the equity premium puzzle -
application in the corporate finance field is rather under-theorised, especially in the
realm of financing decision theory. This paper hence seeks to fill this gap found in
earlier work on financing decision making.
Based upon established prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory conquers
the weakness of violating first order stochastic dominance by weighting cumulative
probability density function instead of probabilities (of individual outcomes). In this
sense, (cumulative) prospect theory is a generalisation of expected utility theory in-
sofar as it describes individual decision-making behaviour. On the other hand, game
theory deals with decision-making when there is interaction among individuals. In
particular, contract theory, based upon game theory and also known as mechanism
design, contract economics or contract design, is being used more frequently in ex-
plaining financing decisions of firms.
Traditionally, trade-off theory and pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) are two
dominant static theories used in explaining firms’ financing behaviour. Trade-off the-
ory asserts that a firm has its optimal level of leverage, which is set by balancing
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the marginal benefit and cost of debt. Pecking order theory argues that managers
have superior information on the qualities of their firms in comparison to outside
financiers. Knowing this, outside financiers will underprice securities issued by good
firms in order to subsidise their loss on the overpricing of securities issued by bad
firms. Pecking order theory also argues that overpricing is less for debt than for
equity. Thus, equity is the last resort when they need outside financing.
However, these two theories have been confronted with a large numbers of
challenges and struggle to explain well-documented stylised facts in firms’ financing
decisions. For example, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relation between
profitability and leverage, which is inconsistent with findings in a large body of em-
pirical research (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and
French, 2002). In the meanwhile, pecking order theory predicts that debt always
dominates equity when firms need external financing. Nevertheless, Jung et al.
(1996) and Frank and Goyal (2003) find that firms do issue equity when they are,
according to pecking order theory, supposed to issue debt. Fama and French (2005)
confirm that firms issue more equity than debt even after controlling for survivor-
ship bias. Moreover, Brennan and Kraus (1987) have identified a theoretical flaw in
pecking order theory by suggesting that while debt is less information-sensitive and
thus favourable under first-order-stochastic-dominance circumstances (with respect
to possible distributions of firm earnings), equity could be less information-sensitive
and more efficient than debt when the distributions of different firms’ earnings are
of second-order-stochastic-dominance (mean-preserving).
Agency models, along with some theories later developed from the contract
theory, incorporate information asymmetry into the study on firms’ financing deci-
sions and explains some of the “puzzles”. For example, In the fundamental Jensen
and Meckling (1976) paper, firms issue both debt and equity to minimize the agency
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costs of these two securities. Biais and Casamatta (1999) provide more formal proof
and completely endogenise contractual terms. Brennan and Kraus (1987) consider
both the first order stochastic dominance case and mean-preserving spread case to
find differential strategies in mitigating information asymmetry.
Most recently, some other attempts have been made to reconcile these is-
sues. The most prominent stream might be dynamic modeling proposed by Fischer
et al. (1989) and advanced by Leland (1994), Goldstein et al. (2001), Hennessy and
Whited (2005) and Gomes and Schmid (2010). Although these studies have largely
improved the explanatory power of the above, one research question has nonetheless
been left open, which this paper aims to answer; that is, are we able to explain these
documented stylised facts with a simple static model? Before we largely increase the
complexity along the path of making model dynamic and thus lose a great amount of
tractability which made classic theories, such as the trade-off theory and the pecking
order theory, widely spread and inspired future research. Another path is to main-
tain the tractability of a static model but relax certain assumptions to make them
more realistic, which has been proven successful in the above-mentioned literature,
especially in the asset pricing realm. Therefore, this paper probes the possibility of
combining (cumulative) prospect theory and the contract theory in explaining the
financing decisions of firms. This is the theoretical motivation of this paper.
This paper starts with some simplified examples. Under the expected utility
hypothesis, there is both a unique pooling equilibrium and a continuum of separat-
ing equilibriums, reconfirming the finding (which is inconsistent with the pecking
order theory) in Brennan and Kraus (1987). In the unique pooling equilibrium, only
equity is issued, whilst in the continuum of separating equilibria, Safe-type (S-type)
issues only equity and Risky-type (R-type) issues any combination of debt and eq-
uity along the financier’s break-even line, due to there being a competitive capital
11
market. Moreover, all the securities are fairly priced. In contrast, under the CPT
hypothesis, these equilibria no longer hold true. Moreover, equilibria under CPT
depend on market conditions. Under circumstances featuring high-prospect (low
success rate but high payoff) projects, we show that there only exists a continuum
of pooling equilibria, whilst under circumstances with safer but low payoffs, we find
only a continuum of separating equilibria.
More importantly, in neither situation are the equilibrium securities fairly
priced. In a market with high prospect projects, both equity and debt are over-
priced, resulting in excessive approvals for negative NPV investment opportunities.
Consequently, when aggregated, these investment opportunities yield ex post neg-
ative average return. The interpretation to be made is that economic agents care
more about the small probability events associated with very high payoff (good
prospects) and thus assign a premium for positively skewed (lottery-like) investment
opportunities and tradeoff average return for those good prospects. This implication
is consistent with observations in real-world capital market and echoes in the pricing
for skewness theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; Harvey and Siddique, 2000).
In a market with low prospect projects, both equity and debt are underpriced.
Consequently, it predicts excessive rejections for positive NPV investment projects,
exhibiting pessimism in the market. In a very recent paper by Banerjee et al. (2016),
they prove and verify in data that firms with more promising future would accept
underpricing and issue equity. They also find that these firms issue equity earlier
than their followers, leading a hot issuing market. Thus their issuances usually
happen before market steps out low prospect status. In this regard, my paper res-
onates with their findings and extend their prediction one step further - the leaders
issue underpriced equity in the market when the market condition is easier for them
to signal their type. Considering The prediction is also consistent with real-world
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capital market observations documented and analyzed by Polk and Sapienza (2009),
Shleifer and Vishny (2010) and Adjei (2011). Interestingly, this aggregate pessimism
is created by a collective of lottery-loving and ambitious individuals in this paper.
Overall, the model yields distinct equilibria under different market conditions; en-
trepreneurs would pool together to exploit financiers when systematic risk is high,
whilst separating themselves so as not to further upset financiers in order to get
funding when systematic risk is low.
We will later formalise the proof and extend the model into continuous types.
Furthermore, we will show that this model is able to shed light on liquidity provi-
sion in primary market, implying that there is more equity issuance in a market with
higher prospect projects whilst more debt issuance in a market with lower prospect
projects.
In summary, the main contribution of this paper lies in its initiative to break
the ice between classic capital structure theories and innovative decision-making the-
ories. As illustrated in this research, this attempt is meaningful because we show
that a large number of prevailing anomalies in the real-world capital market could
be reconciled in the hybrid model without additional assumptions, which are crucial
and artificial in some specific theories’ attempt to explain one particular anomaly
in the financial market. Moreover, the importance of this paper could also be that
it is thought-provoking in two aspects. Theoretically, it suggests theory researchers
that the interdisciplinary hybrid of classic capital structure theories and innova-
tive decision-making theories might be fruitful, less assumption-dependent and thus
promising in its future. Empirically, although preliminary and tentative, the abun-
dant implications generated in this research might interest empirical researchers to
bring this general model into specific tests.
13
The following of this proposal is structured as: Section 2 reviews related
literature. Section 3 introduces a simple binary model as an example. Section 4
formalises and extends the findings. Section 5 involves a preliminary generalization
and discussion of the results. Section 6 presents a conclusion.
2.2 Literature Review
Other than the literature that has motivated the birth of this research, as mentioned
in Section 2.1, remarkable progress has been made over the past decades in exploit-
ing non-expected utility theories to explain “anomalies” which are otherwise unex-
plainable by classic economic or financial economic theories. For example, Barberis
and Huang (2008) justify investors’ taste for skewness focusing on the probability
weighting component of the cumulative prospect theory proposed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992). Garlappi et al. (2007) integrate aversion to ambiguity to portfo-
lio selection model and render portfolios with a higher Sharpe ratio.
In the meantime, literature on contract theory (also known as mechanism
design or contract economics) has grown and gained more attention. Based on game
theory, it has proven powerful in solving problems with limited participants and
when information asymmetry looms large. As a standard principal-agent relation-
ship, a financing decision and thus the capital structure is investigated equipped
with the contract theory. In the fundamental Jensen and Meckling (1976) paper,
firms issue both debt and equity to minimise the agency costs of these two securities.
Biais and Casamatta (1999) give more formal proof and completely endogenise con-
tractual terms. Brennan and Kraus (1987) consider both the first order stochastic
dominance case and mean-preserving spread cases and find differential strategies in
mitigating information asymmetry.
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Only until very recently have successful attempts been made in merging the
above two strands of literature. Dittmann et al. (2010) combine loss aversion with
a principal-agent model to derive the convex optimal contract for CEO compensa-
tion. Spalt (2013) exploits the key feature of probability weighting to justify the
attractiveness of stock options in employee’s pay package. Koufopoulos and Kozhan
(2014) study a competitive insurance market with both asymmetric information and
ambiguity and prove that an increase in ambiguity could relax the high-risk type
agents’ incentive compatibility constraint and thus lead to a strict Pareto improve-
ment under certain circumstances. Nonetheless, no progress has yet been achieved
in utilising the cutting-edge methodology to study the financing decisions of firms.
Therefore, one major contribution of this paper is to fit into the existing
literature through its tentative reconciliation of these two theories in explaining
financing decisions.
2.3 Example
To introduce a new paradigm - namely, the combination of the (cumulative) prospect
theory and the contract theory - I will start progressively from the very beginning.
Thus in this section, I will first introduce a binomial, one-period model, as an ex-
ample. Although parsimonious, it is typical and commonly used in contract theory
problems and suffices to illuminate the main conclusion of this paper. Besides, this
model setting is a simplified version of Brennan and Kraus (1987), where payoffs are
mean-preserving. I start from this model because it is easier to observe how CPT
moves the indifference curves in EU, and then discuss some generalisation later. In
addition, some results in Brennan and Kraus (1987) are paraphrased and then com-
pared with those under cumulative prospect theory.
15
Some preliminary findings from this model suggest that, there would firstly be
distinct equilibriums under EU and CPT. Secondly, even within CPT, there would
be distinct equilibria under different market conditions. Thirdly, investors exhibit
aggregate optimism in a market with high prospect projects, which is defined as
projects with large payoffs but small success probability as in Barberis and Huang
(2008), and aggregate pessimism in a market with low prospect projects, which refer
to projects with moderate payoffs but also moderate to high success probability, al-
though the parameters governing their preference remain the same in both scenarios.
At last, in equilibrium, entrepreneurs would exploit financiers by hiding their private
information (pooling) under high prospect market conditions. They would not want
to upset financiers further under low prospect market conditions, taking a risk of
losing external financing opportunities. Thus, they would rather voluntarily reveal
their types truthfully and separate themselves from the other type. In the next
section, this model will be formalised and generalised in a more rigorous fashion, by
allowing both the payoffs and the types to be distributed continuously.
2.3.1 In the classic expected utility setting
Consider the following simple investment problem where all economic agents make
decisions under expected utility theory (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005): Assume
there are three periods but no discounting for simplicity. And there are two types
of projects: Safe (i = S) and Risky (i = R) with proportion λ and 1 − λ, both re-
quire an investment of I. At time 0, each entrepreneur (principal) has a project and
learns its type but this information is private. The financier (agent) has common
knowledge on the proportion of each type and the investment technology. At time
1, entrepreneur has no fund available thus has to raise I by issuing either debt (D)
or equity (in proportion α) or a combination of both, denoted by Z = (α,D), with
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 andD ≥ 0. Debt is zero-coupon bonds and senior to equity. Entrepreneur
is protected by limited liability. The capital market is competitive. At time 2, safer
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project generates a cash flow of XS with probability pS and 0 otherwise, whereas
risky project generates XR with probability pR and 0 otherwise. Both projects have
the same positive NPV, i.e., NPVR = pRXR − I = pSXS − I = NPVS > 0 or
pRXR = pSXS (mean-preserving). Moreover, XR > XS > 0 and pS > pR. Both
principal and agent are risk neutral. The time line is graphically illustrated as in
Figure2.1.
Figure 2.1: Time Line
Firstly, as noted by Brennan and Kraus (1987), we find that In a pure strat-
egy game, when both principal and agent follow the expected utility theory and are
risk-neutral, there is a unique pooling equilibrium where only equity is issued. And
the issued equity is fairly priced.
While readers can find detailed discussion in Appendix 2.6.1, the intuition
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The intuition here is that the R type entrepreneur is willing to exchange more
debt for a certain amount of equity than the S type entrepreneur because the project
is riskier and thus the equity is more valuable (Figure 2.2). Since (D, α) are the parts
taken out from entrepreneurs’ pocket (“bads” rather than “goods”), the indifference
curves closer to the origin will give entrepreneurs higher utility.
Figure 2.2: The Indifference Curve for the Entrepreneur
The indifference curves (ICs) takes the same shape of the zero profit lines




pi[α(Xi −D) +D)]− I, i = R, S
and the pooling zero profit line (PZP ), when they cannot tell the types of
entrepreneurs:
ΠPZP = λpR[α(XR −D) +D)] + (1− λ)pS[α(XS −D) +D)]− I = 0
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First, any equilibrium contract (α,D) should lie on one of the zero-profit lines
because of perfect competition. For any deviation (e.g., B), the R type always wants
to mimic the S type, because she will be better-off at any contract within ZPR.
However, the R type entrepreneur is willing to exchange more debt for a certain
amount of equity than would the S type entrepreneur because of a higher marginal
substitution rate. Thus, under the intuition criteria as refinement, the S type could
credibly signal her type by making a counter-offer with more equity and less debt.
This is because financiers know that it would only be favourable to the S type as it
would make the R type entrepreneurs worse off. This would eliminate all the con-
tracts on the pooling zero-profit line except for the only stable contract, Z∗, where
no type has incentive to deviate and only equity is issued. Moreover, being that
with this mean-preserving case, the equity is equally valuable to both types, then
the equity is fairly priced.
We also find that: There also exist a continuum of separating equilibria where
the S type issues only equity, while the R type issues any combination of debt and
equity along ZPR. All the securities are fairly priced.
The proof is similar and straightforward. Since this all equity financed con-
tract gives the R type entrepreneurs the same level of utility as if the reveal them-
selves, they are thus indifferent between being pooled with the S type entrepreneurs
and being separated and offered contracts on their own zero-profit line. Instead,
the S type entrepreneurs will always stick to the all equity financed contract as any
deviation will attract the R type entrepreneurs to mimic and be (strictly) worse-off.
2.3.2 In the prospect theory setting
Now let’s shift to a world where both entrepreneurs and financiers make decisions
according to Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
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The selection of reference level is controversial. So far, the most widely ac-
cepted convention is to set the highest (lowest) outcome as the reference level and
define gains and losses based on the relative difference from the highest (lowest)
outcome. Nonetheless, this procedure will eliminate the advantage of loss aversion
property in the (cumulative) Prospect Theory, degenerating to the rank-dependent
expected utility theory (Quiggin, 1982, 1993). An alternative yet reasonable ap-
proach is to define the reference level as the initial level of wealth, or in more com-
plex terms, as expected final wealth (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). This paper will
examine the first approach, leaving the more sophisticated one to future research.
It differs from Quiggin (1982) on how the probability weighting function is specified
- I follow the one defined in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which could be easily
extended to full Cumulative Prospect Theory model (or part of its other aspects) in
the future research.
Formally, entrepreneurs evaluate the gambles
(0, 1− pR;XR, pR)
and (0, 1− pS;XS, pS)
by assigning them the values
πR ·XR + π¬R · 0
πS ·XS + π¬S · 0














ω+(·) is the cumulative probability weighting function 1, taking the shape
ω+(p) =
pδ
(pδ + (1− p)δ)1/δ (2.1)
Figure 2.3: The Probability Weighting Function
The parameters are restricted to δ ∈ (0, 1). Particularly, it captures the cur-
vature of the probability weighting function as illustrated in Figure 2.3.2.
Note that this model degenerates into a classic expected utility model if δ = 1,
indicating that this model setting nests both the expected utility theory and the
rank-dependent expected utility theory. Future research will confront the model
with other properties, such as loss aversion.
In terms of simplicity, we will only consider homogeneous economic agents
in this paper whose perceptions about the objective probabilities are identical. In
other words, their mentally perceived “probabilities” deviate from the true ones in
the same direction and by the same magnitude. Unlike entrepreneurs, who face only
one tier of uncertainty, which is the success rate of the projects, as entrepreneurs,
financiers face two tiers of uncertainties (compound gamble) since they know neither
1for the gains, however the paper restricts the discuss in the gain quadrant of Cumulative Prospect
Theory as in Barberis (2012). The last section discusses more general case.
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the success rate nor the type of those projects:






(0, 1− pS;XS, pS)
(R type, λ;S type, (1− λ))
In the separating equilibriums, where each type could credibly signal itself
and make financiers distinguish it from the other, thus offering distinct contract to
each type, the second tier of uncertainty (on the types) is solved and this compound
gamble will not cause a problem because it is reduced to a simple gamble, which
is the same as that of the entrepreneurs. However, in the pooling equilibrium, the
compound gamble does cause trouble because the reduction principle is violated
under the (cumulative) prospect theory, entailing that the multiplicative property
fails to hold, i.e., ω(λpR) 6= ω(λ) · ω(pR). Some researchers have tried to modify the
probability weighting function and put some conditions to yield a similar decompo-
sition as in the expected utility theory for certain classes of prospects (Stomper and
VierA˜y¨, submitted working paper). One more conventional approach follows Bar-
beris (2012), where the cumulative probability weighting functions are only applied
to the objective probability of final outcomes. In this paper, I will follow the latter
approach because the payoff structure is clear that there is no need to obscure the
main points with modified probability weighting functions.
We find that: Under circumstances featuring high-prospect (low success rate
but high payoff) projects, there is a continuum of stable pooling equilibria.
Before discussing the pooling equilibrium, which located on the pooling zero-
profit line as analysed above, let us define the separating zero-profit lines to facilitate
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further discussion. The separating zero-profit line of each type is given by
Πi = ω
+(pi)[α(Xi −D) +D)]− I = 0, i = R, S
Under the objective proportion, i.e. λ and 1−λ, the actual pooling zero-profit
line (a linear combination of the red lines) should be governed by
ΠλPZP = λω
+(pR)[α(XR −D) +D)] + (1− λ)ω+(pS)[α(XS −D) +D)]− I = 0
However, in a feasible pooling equilibrium, the financier evaluates the gamble
(0, λ(1− pR) + (1− λ)(1− pS);XS, (1− λ)pS;XR, λpR)
by assigning it the value
π¬R,S · 0 + πPS ·XS + πPR ·XR






+((1− λ)pS + λpR)− ω+(λpR)
π¬R,S = ω
+(1)− ω+((1− λ)pS + λpR)
ω+(·) is the same cumulative probability weighting function with that of en-
trepreneurs, Equation 2.1. And according to the game structure presented above,
the financiers in Cumulative Prospect Theory world would first evaluate the event
with high prospect, a large payoff associated with a low probability.
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Due to the fact that probability weighting function is a monotonic transfor-
mation from the original utility function, the problem is much simplified; that is,
the marginal rate of substitution remains the same. Since the shape of indifference
curves does not depend on probabilities, as does the zero-profit line of financiers,
the reasoning in previous subsection also goes through here straightforwardly.
Figure 2.4: The Pooling Equilibrium When Market Is Risky
Given the above transformations, the (actual) mean-preserving model takes
the form of the dashed black lines in Figure 2.4. The pooling zero-profit lines passing
Point O is the traditional zero-profit line with additive proportion, while the pooling
zero-profit line for the perceived (but actually mean-preserving) projects is the lower
dashed blue line2. Following a similar reasoning as in Section 2.3.1, it is easy to
find that the unique stable equilibrium (Point O) breaks down into a continuum of
equilibria with weighted probabilities. The above is due to the fact that Cumulative
Prospect Theory violates the reduction principle for compound gambles and makes
the pooling zero-profit line not a linear combination of the separating zero-profit
lines because the weights do not add up to one in the presence of multiple tiers of





We first note that calculated using the objective weights, i.e. λ and 1 − λ,
the actual pooling zero-profit line (a linear combination of the red lines) passes the
intersection of two perceived separating zero-profit lines. Therefore, the analysis of
equilibrium under EU remains except that now the unique pooling equilibrium would
be the point O in the middle, as no one wants to deviate at this point. We should also
note that in Figure 2.4, the new pooling zero-profit line is below the actual pooling
zero-profit line. This exists in an economy with high prospect projects. Specifically,
the parameter combinations which satisfy the following inequality sustain the pooling
equilibria
λw+(pR)XR + (1− λ)w+(pS)XS
w+(λpR)XR + (w+((1− λ)pS + λpR)− w+(λpR))XS < 1
The condition follows from the relationship between the intercepts of each
pooling zero-profit line at D = 0. We find that while the parameters interacts with
each other and is difficult to give an explicit expression, in general a lower pR and
a higher XR (which is defined as high prospect, or lottery-like, project in Barberis
and Huang (2008)) gives more chance to sustain these pooling equilibria.
With details in Appendix 2.6.2, we show that the interval ÂB are stable
equilibria. The key difference in this game is that the contracts on the separated
zero-profit lines will give to both types of entrepreneurs those utilities that are no
higher than the utilities of the two extremes of the interval ÂB, contract A and B.
In other words, any deviating strategy is (weakly) dominated by the strategies at
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Point A/Point B. Therefore, they will survive the intuition criteria and it will be
sustained as a stable equilibrium. For any one contract within this interval - say
C - any deviation will, at most, benefit one type but not the other. Otherwise it
is below all the zero-profit lines, which means financiers are loss-making and they
will not accept this loss-making contract. Thus, by intuition criteria, financiers will
be able to separate the types by the deviation and offer each type contracts located
on their corresponding (separated) zero-profit line. Again, since the separating con-
tracts are (strictly) dominated by the original pooling contract C, this deviation is
not profitable. Thus, any contract within this interval could be sustained as a stable
equilibrium constituting a continuum of stable equilibria.
Since the new pooling zero-profit line is below the actual pooling zero-profit
line, a natural consequence is that, even the projects are of negative NPV under the
expected utility theory and should not be carried out, i.e., the intersection with the
α axis is above 13 and they will be undertaken under weighted probabilities.
In contrast, we also find that: Under circumstances with safer but low-payoff
projects, there is no pooling equilibrium but a continuum of separating equilibria.
When the economy contains safer but low-payoff projects - for example, in
the time period just after an economic crisis - this set of parameters will generate a
perceived pooling zero-profit line higher than the traditional pooling zero-profit line
with weights adding up to 1, as shown in Figure 2.5.
Different to the previous case, any contract within the interval ĈD cannot
3In fact, a negative NPV project cannot be represented in this diagram, as it requires α ≤ 1.
However, a negative NPV project under the expected utility theory might be a positive NPV project
under the Cumulative Prospect Theory and could this be represented in this diagram. Therefore,
for illustrative convenience, I assume these negative NPV projects do exist in this diagram with
intersections on the α axis above 1
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Figure 2.5: The Pooling Equilibrium When Market Is Less Risky
then be sustained as an equilibrium because it gives utilities lower than any contract
could give on the separating zero-profit lines. In other words, any contract within
the interval ĈD is (strictly) dominated by separating contracts and cannot be sus-
tained as an equilibrium.
Nonetheless, there is still a continuum of separating equilibria located on the
whole outer boundary of the shape, comprising of the intervals ÔC and ÔD on the
two separating zero-profit lines except for Point O. The above occurs because the
entrepreneurs can credibly signal their own types as the strategy of mimicking the
other type is too costly to be carried out. In other words, mimicking strategies are
(strictly) dominated by separating strategies. For example, if the S type chooses
contract C on its zero-profit line above Point O, then it is unreasonable for the R
type to mimic the S type by also choosing contract C because this contract is above
his own zero-profit line which means it will give her a lower level of utility than the
contracts on her zero-profit line, e.g. contract D. Note that Point O is excluded
because, at this point, financiers cannot distinguish the two types and pool them
using the pooling zero-profit line higher than the traditional pooling zero-profit line
with weights adding up to 1. This discontinuity is due to multi-layers of uncertainty
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in CPT. Since it is simply a mechanical result when the CPT is combined with the
contract theory, it could be eliminated by defining a commensurate equilibrium re-
finement, which admits Point O as a separating equilibrium. Hence, we have proved
that there is no pooling equilibrium.
It is also important to note that in Figure 2.5, the new pooling zero-profit line
is above the actual pooling zero-profit line. In this scenario, even the projects are of
positive NPV under the expected utility theory and should be carried out, i.e. the
intersection with the α axis is below 1, they will not be undertaken under the cumula-
tive prospect theory if the new pooling zero-profit intersect with the α axis above 14.
Overall, we find that in the world where individual behaviour conforms to
prospect theory, the capital market would exhibit different types of equilibrium
under different scenarios. In a market with high prospect projects, only pooling
equilibria exist, with R-type and S-type choosing the same combination of certain
proportion of equity and face value of debt to fund their distinct projects. In con-
trast, only separating equilibria exist in a market with low prospect projects, where
R-type chooses a combination with more debt whilst S-type picks up a combination
with more equity. In making a comparison of the difference here, the results should
be interpreted as the following. Knowing the financiers are subject to two-tier uncer-
tainty, the entrepreneurs enjoy an information rent of choosing favourable contracts
when the prospect is high and they avoid unfavorable contracts when the prospect
is low, resulting from their private information.
4Again, a negative NPV project cannot be represented in this diagram as it requires α ≤ 1. However,
for illustrative convenience, I assume these negative NPV projects do exist in this diagram with
intersections on the α axis above 1
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2.3.3 Discussion on No-arbitrage Condition
One potential concern is that the established equilibria might fail to meet the no-
arbitrage condition if investors or entrepreneurs are able to replicate their position
and short-sell the replicating portfolio. Research on prospect theory documents that
the boundary behaviour of the cumulative prospect theory is not well-defined, as in-
dividuals with prospect theory preferences would accept gambles with arbitrarily
large negative expected values, triggering an infinite shot-selling problem (Azevedo
and Gottlieb, 2012; Jin and Zhou, 2013). De Giorgi et al. (2010) further argue that
the non-convexity of CPT preferences may lead to the non-existence of market equi-
libria, with even a non-negativity constraint being imposed on final wealth. However,
as this paper is particularly interested in studying the application of CPT, specifically
the probability weighting function, on corporate finance issues, and its implications
towards the real-world capital structure decision makings, we restrict our discussion
in the gain quadrant by setting the reference point 0, as it is under EU. Generally, we
could relax this assumption by imposing non-negativity constraints on final wealth
and the assumption of a continuum of agents in the market as in De Giorgi et al.
(2010), or by imposing assumptions on priori bounds on leverage and/or potential
losses as in Jin and Zhou (2013). Here we show that, in the currently available
information set, we may at least find in our binary case model the existence of one
set of pricing kernel that can correctly price all the assets and be positive.
As illustrated in Figure 2.6, the fair present value (PV) of external financing
should be equivalent to I, indicating that, at any separating equilibrium:
qα∗t ,D∗t (α
∗
t (Xt −D∗t ) +D∗t ) + (1− qα∗t ,D∗t ) · 0
1 + rf
= I, t ∈ {R, S}
Rearrange, we have:
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Figure 2.6: The Binomial Tree of Payoffs
qα∗t ,D∗t =
(1 + rf)I
α∗t (Xt −D∗) +D∗t
, t ∈ {R, S}
which are the sets of pricing kernels for both types of project and the real op-
tions (external debt/equity) written upon them. The limited liability and positivity
condition ensures that both sets of pricing kernels are positive, implying no-arbitrage
opportunity. The CPT enters the pricing kernels through the equilibrium level α∗
and D∗ in a more complicated way, but this is not one of the main interests of this
paper.
In the same fashion we could find a set of pricing kernels at any pooling
equilibrium, and upon the currently available information set, it satisfies the no-
arbitrage condition.
2.4 Formal Model Setting and Assumptions
We consider a model where an entrepreneur is endowed with a technology that gen-
erates future stochastic earnings x ∈ X ≡ [0, K], and requires I > 0 units of capital
as input. We allow for unbounded future earnings by letting K go to infinity. To fi-
nance his project, the entrepreneur can seek funds from competitive financiers, each
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of whom is endowed with equal amount of capital I. To make our model sufficiently
general to compare with cases under CPT, we assume all agents risk averse, with
the same utility function U(·). We normalize the risk-free rate to zero. There are
two types of projects (entrepreneurs), t ∈ T ≡ {R, S}5. The types differ according
to their distribution of earnings. The cumulative distribution function (cdf) over
X for a type t project is Ft(x). The project type is the private information of the
entrepreneur. Outside financiers only know that a fraction λR ∈ (0, 1) are type R
projects, and a fraction λS = 1− λR are type S projects. All projects have positive
net present value, and the firm’s assets in place are assumed to be zero.
Denote by Et(x) =
∫∞
o
U(x) dFt(x) the full information expected utility of a
type t project. We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. Et(x) ≥ I > 0 for every t ∈ T .
Assumption 1 says that a financier can fund a project, and all projects have
positive net present value. In addition, we make the following standard assumptions
on the distributions of earnings:
Assumption 2.
1. The cdfs are mutually absolutely continuous;
2. Securities are risky: Ft(I − ǫ) > 0 for all t ∈ T, and for all ǫ > 0;
Continuity is assumed for technical reasons. Being that our problem is in-
teresting only if the investment might be loss making with positive probability (i.e.
it is impossible to issue riskless securities), then point (2) of 2 ensures that is the case.
The timing of the game is the same as we discussed in Section 2.3. A financing
contract is either debt (D) or equity (in proportion α) or a combination of both,
5Accurately, the types here are not about riskiness any more. Rather, they should be denoted as l,h,
low or high in productivity. However, we will keep the denotation for consistency. This binary-type
case is, in fact, relaxed in the following research
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denoted by z ∈ Z ≡ {(α,D)}. The only restriction we impose on the contract space
is that each security must satisfy limited liability, as:
Assumption 3. Z ≡ {(α,D)|0 ≤ α ≤ 1, D ≤ x}
Finally, denote by Ut the expected utility of an entrepreneur of type t, and
by Uf the financier’s expected utility. We can then write
Ut = Et[U((1− α)(x−D))] (2.2)
Uf = Eλ(z)[U(z)] (2.3)
The expectation in 2.3 is given by the sum across types (weighted by the
posterior belief λ(t|z) that type t is issuing the contract z) of the final payoff of the







U(α(x−D) +D) dFt(x) (2.4)
2.4.1 The Properties of Equilibria with Weighted Probabil-
ity
In this subsection we will probe further into what the equilibria can tell us, and what
is the difference between equilibria under two decision-making theories. Moreover,
this difference might help explain current real-world anomalies. In the following
section, I firstly show that there is an ordinal relationship between the equilibrium(s)
under EU and those with probability weighting.
Lemma 2.4.1 (The Ordinal Relationship of Equilibrium(s)). Under circumstances
featuring high prospect projects, given an equilibrium-level equity issue under EU
theory, if there is also an equilibrium under weighted probability with the same equity
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issuance, the pairwise debt issuance with weighted probability must be lower than that
under EU.
Proof. Suppose an equilibrium contract z∗ = (α∗, D∗) under EU. It should satisfy
the pooling zero profit condition:
∫
x∈X
U(α∗(x−D∗) +D∗) dFX,T (x, t)) = U(I)
Here I is also known as the certainty equivalent (CE) over the domain X × T .
However, the feature of probability weighting function in the gain quadrant,
ω+(·), is to overweight the small probability event and underweight the large prob-
ability event. As discussed in previous section, when the prospect is high, the small
probability is associated with a large payoff and this creates a first order stochas-
tic dominating distribution over the objective one. We should also note that both
utility functions in the gain quadrant are concave; thus Jensen’s inequality holds for
both of them. Therefore, the CE under CPT is higher than the required investment





ν(α∗(x−D∗) +D∗) dω+(1− FX,T (x, t)))
> I
where ν(X) is the value function in CPT and ν(X) = X in this paper. As a result,
for the participation constraint to hold in the equilibrium under CPT, for the same
level of α∗, D∗CPT ≤ D∗. More generally, the equilibria with weighted probability is
closer to the origin under any Lebesgue measure defined on Z.
This property is due to the underlying mechanism that the multiplication
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rule fails under CPT. Thus ω(λpR) 6= ω(λ) · ω(pR), distorting the objective joint
distribution FX,T (x, t). The case of separating equilibria are trivial, as the pool-
ing equilibrium, if exists, would be preserved as a separating equilibrium under an
equilibrium refinement method which is consistent with CPT.
2.5 Conclusions and Limitations
In this paper, we aim to show that when market participants are lottery-loving and
ambitious - in the sense that they care more about the small probability events
associated with very high payoff (good prospect) - then unique equilibrium under
EU breaks down into multi-equilibria, which might contribute to the debate of not
finding an optimal leverage. We find that collectively, firms’ financing decisions un-
der prospect theory depends on market conditions. In a market with high prospect
projects, there only exists a continuum of pooling equilibria, whilst in a market with
low prospect projects, we find only a continuum of separating equilibria. These
are distinct from the equilibria under the expected utility hypothesis, where both a
unique pooling equilibrium and a continuum of separating exist(Brennan and Kraus,
1987). The interpretation to be given here is the following. Entrepreneurs would pool
together to exploit financiers under circumstances featuring high prospect projects,
whilst separating themselves so as not to upset financiers further and obtain funding
when the economy consists of safer and low-payoff projects.
We also show how the model could justify a lower use of debt when the
prospect is high, potentially offering an alternative approach in explaining fluctua-
tions in liquidity provisions in the primary market. Hence, the model might be able
to capture the stylised fact that more equity issuances are observed in a market with
high prospect projects, whilst more debt issuances are observed in a market with
low prospect projects.
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Besides, on one hand, the negative NPV investment opportunities might be
undertaken, providing a negative average return when aggregated. The interpreta-
tion to be given here is that the economic agents assign a premium for positively
skewed (lottery-like) investment opportunities. These implications are consistent
with real-world capital market observations, such as pricing for skewness in the cap-
ital market (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; Harvey and Siddique, 2000; Mitton and
Vorkink, 2007; Fu, 2009; Boyer et al., 2010).
On the other hand, even the positive NPV investment opportunities could be
foregone. This happens when the prospect is low; for example, in the time period
just after an economic crisis. This prediction is consistent with real-world capi-
tal market observations (Polk and Sapienza, 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Adjei,
2011), where the adoption of positive NPV investment opportunities are more closely
related to credit squeeze. Other behavioural studies introduce another assumption
of over-pessimism to explain the adoption of positive NPV investment opportunities.
Interestingly, this paper offers an alternative explanation even when individuals are
still lottery-loving and ambitious.
An interesting future attempt is to allow the preference of the entrepreneur
and the financier to be different. Recent empirical findings show that entrepreneurs
are more lottery-loving than the financier (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lie, 2005;
Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Brown and Sarma, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008;
Goel and Thakor, 2008), due to the misalignment of incentives/aims between en-
trepreneurs and financiers. In line with these evidences, an educated guess would
suggest that the existence of asymmetric information might not always destroy social
efficiency. Instead, it could alleviate the economic efficiency loss otherwise caused
by the over-prospect-oriented entrepreneur in the “First Best” scenario (no asym-
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metric information), based on the assumptions that the entrepreneur has private
information and the capital market is competitive. This efficiency restoring effect
might result from that fact that the equilibrium contract must lie exactly on fi-
nanciers’ zero-profit line, i.e. the contracts that would just make them break-even,
as the capital market is competitive. Therefore, even if entrepreneurs are willing
to take more ambitious action, as long as their prospect theory utilities are still
positive, it is the financiers who decide whether or not to take contract. Over-
all, the existence of asymmetric information then grants financiers the power to
regulate over-prospect-oriented entrepreneurs’ behaviour. Similar welfare-improving
effects under non-expected utility theories have been found by Vercammen (2002),
de Garidel-Thoron (2005) and Koufopoulos and Kozhan (2014).
Another interesting extension could focus on the reference level. As afore-
mentioned, in this paper I adopted the most widely accepted convention - to set the
lowest outcome as the reference level and define gains based on the relative difference
from the lowest outcome, similar to that in Barberis and Huang (2008). An alter-
native way could be defining the reference level as the initial level of wealth, or in
more complex terms, as expected final wealth (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). In this
paper, it would not largely change the result as I suppress the value function and
directly evaluate the wealth, as well as the success rate of projects would not change
at different reference level. However, changing the reference level, for example, to
include asset in place, would introduce another aspect of Cumulative Prospect The-
ory - loss aversion. This will result in a more complicated, yet interesting, analysis.
In Loughran and Ritter (2002), they study the large first-day run-up phenomenon
of IPO, which is regarded as losses from the perspective of issuing firms. They find
distinct results under different market environments and the trade-off of returns for
prospects, which are similar to what presented in this paper. Therefore I doubt
more interesting results could be yielded albeit introducing much more complexity
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by changing the reference level.
Although the assumption of a competitive capital market is reasonable most
of the time, under extreme conditions it is not necessary and usually violated; for ex-
ample, during a financial crisis. In such a period, liquidity is very tight in the capital
market and entrepreneurs have to compete for scarce external capital entailing that
financiers may be able to extract economic rent for owning this scarcity. In other
words, the bargaining power may belong to financiers instead of entrepreneurs in
some extreme circumstances. Therefore, this paper focuses on studying the generic
problems and advises readers to be alert to the validity of the assumption because
the impact of the exogenous shock changing the economic environment of the market
would be very different.
In conclusion, the main contribution of this paper is to offer a better approx-
imation of the real-world corporate financing decisions by relaxing the assumption
of expected utility for prospect theory. It is tentative but ice-breaking in reconcil-
ing classic capital structure theories and innovative decision making theories. It is
general but fruitful in shedding light upon a large number of prevailing anomalies
in the real-world capital market. Finally, it is preliminary but thought-provoking in
directing future studies for both theoretical and empirical researchers.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Appendix: The Equilibriums under EU
A sketched proof suffices to reveal the main point while keeping the intuition: The




pi(1− α)(Xi −D), i = R, S
The financier solves the problem:
maxΠi = max
(α,D)
pi[α(Xi −D) +D)]− I, i = R, S
Taking the total derivative of Ui and rearranging it, we have the marginal substitu-




)Ui = U¯ = −
1− α
Xi −D
Thus the indifference curve of R type is flatter in the (D, α) space. The
intuition here is that the R type entrepreneur is willing to exchange more debt for
certain amount of equity than the S type entrepreneur because the project is riskier
and thus the equity is more valuable (Figure 2.2).
The indifference curves can shift toward and away from the origin as they are
projections from the utility dimension (like contour lines on a topographical map).
Moreover, since (D, α) are the parts taken out from entrepreneurs’ pocket (“bads”
rather than “goods”), then the indifference curves closer to the origin will give en-
trepreneurs higher utility. In other words, to maximize their utility, they prefer a
contract which will put them on an indifference curve lower than the other contracts
can.
Since the capital market is competitive, all financiers earn zero profit. In
the same way as we derived the marginal substitution rate of equity to debt for
entrepreneurs, we can easily find the shapes of the zero-profit lines of financiers for
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the R type (ZPR) and S type (ZPS) are the same with the indifference curves of
corresponding entrepreneur (Figure 2.7). The difference is that while the indifference
curves can shift toward and away from the origin, the zero-profit lines are fixed in


















Figure 2.7: The Zero Profit-Line for the Financier
In Figure 2.7, where PZP is the pooling zero-profit line, which is stipulated by
ΠPZP = λpR[α(XR −D) +D)] + (1− λ)pS[α(XS −D) +D]− I = 0
First, we notice that any equilibrium contract (α,D) should lie on one of the
zero-profit lines because of perfect competition. Then, by a standard signaling game
argument, for any deviation (e.g., B), the R type always wants to mimic the S type
because she will be better-off at any contract within ZPR. However, as mentioned
above, the R type entrepreneur is willing to exchange more debt for certain amount
of equity than the S type entrepreneur because the project is riskier and thus the
equity is more valuable. Thus, with intuition criteria as the method of refinements,
the S type could credibly signal her type by making a counteroffer with more equity
and less debt. This is because financiers know that it would only be of interest to
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the S type as it would make the R type entrepreneurs worse-off, thus updating their
posterior belief that the counteroffer must come from the S type being 1. This would
eliminate all the contracts on the pooling zero-profit line except for the only stable
contract, Z∗, where no type has an incentive to deviate and only equity is issued.
Moreover, being that, in this mean-preserving case, the equity is equally valuable to
both types, the equity is fairly priced.
2.6.2 Appendix: The Equilibria in High Prospect Economy




ω+(pi)(1− α)(Xi −D), i = R, S (2.6)
The financier again enjoys zero-profit in the competitive capital market. In
the separating equilibrium:
Πi = ω
+(pi)[α(Xi −D) +D)]− I = 0, i = R, S (2.7)






Taking the total derivative of UCPTi and rearranging, we have the same








= UCPT = −
1− α
Xi −D (2.9)
This result is straightforward being that the shape of indifference curves does
not depend on probabilities. To put it more generally, this is a monotonic trans-
formation from the original utility function; thus the marginal rate of substitution
remains the same and so does the zero-profit line of financiers.
First, we can easily show that given the above transformations, the (actual)
mean-preserving model takes the form of the dashed black lines in Figure 2.4. So far
we have not discussed the effect of the change in the equilibrium contract because as
long as the investment technologies are sufficiently widespread, we can always find a
project under the traditional expected utility theory, which gives us the same form as
the dashed black lines. Instead, we will focus on a more interesting difference; even
if there is an actual project that gives the same game structure, the unique stable
equilibrium will break down into a continuum of equilibria under the Cumulative
Prospect Theory.
In Figure 2.4, the pooling zero-profit lines passing Point O is the traditional
zero-profit line with additive proportion:
Π˜PZP = λω
+(pR)[α(XR −D) +D)] + (1− λ)ω+(pS)[α(XS −D) +D)]− I = 0(2.10)
Following a similar reasoning as in Section 2.6.1, it is easy to find that the
Point O is the new equilibrium contract for this actual project. The pooling zero-
profit line for the perceived (but actually mean-preserving) projects is stipulated by
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Equation 2.8, which is the lower dashed blue line in Figure 2.4. Under circumstances
featuring high prospect projects, the proportion of R type projects λ is large and
the success rates of projects (pR, pS) are low. Since higher risk is compensated by
higher return, and individuals are more likely to gamble when the return is higher,
the coefficient δ in the probability weighting function is therefore lower. Overall, this
set of parameters will generate a pooling zero-profit line, profiled by Equation 2.8,
lower than the traditional pooling zero-profit line with weights add up to 1 (given by
Equation 2.10). This is due to the fact that the Cumulative Prospect Theory violates
the reduction principle for compound gambles and entails that the pooling zero-profit
line is not a linear combination of the separating zero-profit lines with weights adding
up to 1 in the presence of multiple tiers of uncertainty. Mathematically,
ΠCPTPZP = ω+(λpR)[α(XR−D)+D)]+{ω+[(1−λ)pS+λpR]−ω+(λpR)}[α(XS−D)+D)]−I
6= ω+(λ)ω+(pR)[α(XR−D)+D)]+ω+(1−λ)ω+(pS)[α(XS−D)+D)]−I
The discussion of the proportions above Point A and below Point B on the
new pooling zero-profit line resembles the argument in Proposition ??. The result is
that these contracts are eliminated by intuition criteria which we elaborate upon by
showing that every contract between A and B can be sustained as stable equilibrium.
First, I show that Point A is a stable equilibrium. Since we know that the contracts
above A cannot survive, imagine any deviation into the area ÔAB. This deviation
implies a marginal substitution rate higher than the marginal substitution rate of
the S type, but lower than that of the R type. It will push the indifference curve
of the S type further and pull that of the R type closer toward the origin. In other
words, the deviation will give the S type a lower utility, while it gives the R type a
higher utility. Thus, it must come from the R type as it is only of interest to the R
type, but will make the S type worse-off. By intuition criteria, financiers should be
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sure about the types and able to separate them, and react in turn by offering each
type a contract on the respective zero-profit line (black dashed lines in Figure 2.4).
Nevertheless, the contracts on the separated zero-profit lines will give both types of
entrepreneurs those utilities that no higher than the utilities of contract A. In other
words, the strategies in the deviation are (weakly) dominated by the strategies at
Point A. Therefore, Point A survives the intuition criteria and is sustained as a sta-
ble equilibrium. A similar reasoning also applies to Point B.
So far, we have proved that the two extremes of the interval ÂB are stable
equilibria. Now imagine any one contract within this interval - say C. Here, any
deviation will at most benefit one type but not the other; otherwise it is below all
the zero-profit lines, which means financiers are loss-making and they will not accept
this loss-making contract. Thus, according to the intuition criteria, financiers are
able to separate the types by the deviation and offer each type contracts located
on their corresponding (separated) zero-profit line. Again, since the separating con-
tracts are (strictly) dominated by the original pooling contract C, this deviation is
not profitable. Thus any contract within this interval could be sustained as a stable
equilibrium constituting a continuum of stable equilibria.
2.6.3 Appendix: The Equilibria in Low Prospect Economy
When there are more safer and low-payoff projects - for example, the time period
just after an economic crisis - the proportion of R type projects λ is small and the
success rates of projects (pR, pS) are high. Since lower risk is compensated by lower
return, and individuals are less likely to gamble when the return is lower, the co-
efficient δ in the probability weighting function is thus higher. Overall, this set of
parameters will generate a pooling zero-profit line, profiled by Equation 2.8, higher
than the traditional pooling zero-profit line with weights adding up to 1 (given by
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Equation 2.10).
First, analogous to the reasoning in Section 2.3.1, all the contracts above
Point C and below Point D on the new pooling zero-profit line cannot survive in-
tuition criteria because any deviation will only be in favor of one type and is thus
perfectly informative to financiers. In the meantime, any contract within the interval
ĈD cannot be sustained as an equilibrium either. This is very straightforward as it
positions utilities lower than any contract could give on the separating zero-profit
lines. In other words, any contract within the interval ĈD is (strictly) dominated
by separating contracts and thus cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
Nonetheless, resembling the game in which projects have the same zero-profit
lines, but under the expected utility theory, there exists a continuum of separating
equilibria which is located on the whole outer boundary of the shape comprising of
the intervals ÔC and ÔD on the two separating zero-profit lines, except for Point O.
This is because the entrepreneurs can credibly signal their own types as the strategy
of mimicking the other type is too costly to be carried out. In other words, mimick-
ing strategies are (strictly) dominated by separating strategies. For example, if the S
type chooses contract C on its zero-profit line above Point O, then it is unreasonable
for the R type to mimic the S type by also choosing contract C because this con-
tract is above his own zero-profit line. This means that it will give her a lower level
of utility than the contracts on her zero-profit line, e.g. contract D. Note that this
continuum of separating equilibria are not exactly the same as the continuum of sep-
arating equilibria under the expected utility theory, even if with the same zero-profit
lines. Point O is excluded because at this point financiers cannot distinguish the two
types and pool them using the pooling zero-profit line higher than the traditional
pooling zero-profit line with weights adding up to 1. As discussed in the paper, this
discontinuity results from multi-layers of uncertainty in CPT could be eliminated by
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defining a commensurate equilibrium refinement. Hence, we have proved that there
is no pooling equilibrium.
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Chapter 3
The Role of Model Uncertainty in
Corporate Risk Management
3.1 Introduction
The importance of corporate risk management has increased rapidly to a non-trivial
level in recent years. Fifty per cent of firms have taken active positions with deriva-
tives globally(Lins et al., 2011). The magnitude is also substantial, for example
Allayannis and Weston (2001) find a hedge ratio of 22% with respect to exchange
rate risk, and Chernenko and Faulkender (2012) document interest swap covers 6.8%
of firms’ debt every year. For an alternative risk management tool, cash, Sa´nchez
and Yurdagul (2013) observe that cash constitutes 12% of net assets in 2010. This
increase is mostly due to precautionary savings (Bates et al., 2009).
The increasing attention paid to corporate risk management motivates the
need for advanced guiding theory. However, although many efforts have been made,
extant literature leaves a puzzle in the dynamics of risk management policy, and is
inconclusive with respect to firm value creation. Stulz (1996) remarks “[t]he actual
corporate use of derivatives, however, does not seem to correspond closely to the
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theory ... large companies make far greater use of derivatives than small firms, even
though small firms have more volatile cash flows, more restricted access to capi-
tal, and thus presumably more reason to buy protection against financial trouble.”
A potential reason for this open research question might be that although model
uncertainty implicitly underlies all the models, it has long been neglected. Recent
studies, such as DeMarzo and Sannikov (2016) and De´camps et al. (2015), show
that accounting for this uncertainty might help identify missing patterns in previous
literature of other closely related fields.
This paper, therefore, examines how the resolution of model uncertainty drives
the dynamics of corporate risk management policy, as well as its impact on the firm
value creation – destruction effect of hedging and cash reserves.
We approach the research question using a parsimonious structural model,
where the only uncertainty is the correlation between a firm’s cash flow and the
underlying asset of derivatives (which we later refer to as “hedgeability”). The firm
is assumed to have a neutral knowledge, defined as 50% being a high hedgeability
firm and 50% being a low one, on the hedgeability of its cash flows, and needs to
observe and learn from realization of the cash flow process. These informative real-
izations allow the firm to form a belief on its hedgeability, towards either high or low.
Most of our findings are consistent with existing literature. In addition, we
identify the channels of both substitutability and complementarity between hedging
and cash balance. This indicates that cash stock is an indispensable risk manage-
ment tool; thus, it coexists with hedging, even in the (seemingly) perfect hedge
scenario.
We find that resolution of model uncertainty accelerates the establishment of
47
a firm’s hedging position, and cash helps with the process. In this regard, we answer
Stulz (1996). We argue that size might be a spurious determinant of corporate hedg-
ing. Rather, mature firms with better knowledge would hedge more than younger,
less informed firms.
Moreover, our results support both directions in the mixed empirical evidence,
depending on the trade-off between the expected reduction in external financing
losses and the decrease in the option value of default. Under some reasonable cir-
cumstances, a risk-shifting effect would dominate a firm’s risk management concerns.
This finding is evidenced by Rampini et al. (2014), where they find a risk-shifting
behaviour in small financially constrained airlines who “hedge less or not at all.”
Overall, we conclude that dynamic information acquisition is an important
determinant of corporate risk management. The main contribution of this paper is
that it is the first attempt, to our knowledge, to connect unravelling model uncer-
tainty to the dynamics of corporate risk management policy. We also find it might
shed light on the debate over the value creation role of hedging. We also provide
some suggestions for the direction of future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews related lit-
erature and positions this paper. Section 3.3 sets up our model, as well as states
the assumptions, limitations, and potential extensions of this model. Section 3.4
calibrates the model, and presents optimal policies of corporations in the dynamic
choices of cash holdings and hedging with the results of simulations. Section 3.5
discusses the marginal effects of each risk management tool and conducts sensitiv-
ity analyses on firm value creation. Section 3.5 concludes and discusses potential
extensions of this paper as well as interesting future research topics.
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3.2 Literature Review
This paper is empirically motivated and naturally fits into dynamic corporate fi-
nance literature, especially those with learning feature.
It is a well understood theory that in a world without economic friction there
is no benefit for corporations to manage risk, as idiosyncratic risks could be diver-
sified by investors and systematic risks are correctly priced in an efficient market.
Thus, firms should not engage in risk management. This theory, however, is at
odds with the evidence observed across countries and industries. Guay and Kothari
(2003) find 57% firms using hedging. Allayannis and Weston (2001) find a hedge
ratio of 22% in exchange rate risk. For another widely used risk management tool,
cash, Mart´ınez-Sola et al. (2013) find that in US industrial firms from 2001 to 2007,
the mean cash ratio is 7.9% and the median is 4.48%. Bates et al. (2009) show this
ratio has, on average, more than doubled to 23.2% in 2006. Finally, Sa´nchez and
Yurdagul (2013) find the absolute value of cash holding was still increasing at an
increasing speed, 10% between 1995 and 2010 versus 7% between 1980 and 1995 in
the US, which resulted in an average 12% cash:net asset ratio in 2010.
Firms hedge their risk to reduce the expected costs of financial distress (Smith
and Stulz, 1985), to lower the expected tax payments under a convex tax schedule
(Smith and Stulz, 1985; Foley et al., 2007), and to avoid costly external financing;
this is achieved by better matching internal cash flow with financing needs (Froot
et al., 1993). All these are convex cost functions for the firm, and due to Jensen’s
inequality, the value of corporate risk management derives from minimizing the ex-
pected value of the cost by either reducing the volatility of cash flow or increasing
the average cash flow.
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Nonetheless, the empirical findings show mixed, sometimes counterintuitive,
results. Allayannis and Weston (2001), Graham and Rogers (2002), Carter et al.
(2006), MacKay and Moeller (2007), and Campello et al. (2011) find that hedging
increases the value of the firm, whereas Brown (2001), Guay and Kothari (2003),
Jin and Jorion (2006), Magee (2009), and Bartram et al. (2011) find either opposite
support from the data or at least an unclear answer to this question.
Moreover, this classic corporate risk management theory predicts that young
firms, which usually have more volatile cash flows, should engage more in risk man-
agement than established firms. Nevertheless, this claim is not well-founded in
evidence. In contrast, Nance et al. (1993) find that hedgers are usually large firms.
Graham and Rogers (2002) also identify that hedging increases with firm size. Fi-
nally, Bartram et al. (2009)find no correlation between young firms’ hedge and fi-
nancial distress.
Most dynamic models in corporate finance treat model uncertainty and risk
management separately. Our model, however, links these two strands of literature.
Particularly, in this paper, we investigate the interaction between hedgeability and
risk management under a specific market friction – external financing cost.
That risk management can be properly understood only in a dynamic setup
has been shown in many papers. A seminal paper, Mello et al. (1995) find that cor-
porate hedging policy is endogenous with flexibility in production, and agency costs
play an important role in this relationship. More recently, the work of Bolton et al.
(2011) and Bolton et al. (2014) highlights Q-theoretical models and using cash (liq-
uidity) holdings as either a means of risk management or financial flexibility. Nikolov
et al. (2015) recognise the validity of coexistence of cash and other risk management
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tools1; while cash is efficient at transferring liquidity across time, we still need an-
other device to protect us across states of the world so as to maximise the value of
a firm. In a time series, equity issuances are used to replenish cash balances, and
state-contingent risk management tools are used to fund unanticipated investment
opportunities. In our paper, we reconfirm their main findings and extend them by
considering hedging and cash reserves endogenously, thus yielding more interesting
implications.
Only very recently have successful attempts been made in comparing the ben-
efit from hedging and that from cash holding. Our paper mostly relates to this strand
of extant literature. The model in Gamba and Triantis (2008) endogenises dynamic
financing, investment, and cash holding – pay out policies to analyse the effect of
financial flexibility on firm value. They find that the value of financing flexibility de-
pends on“the costs of external financing; the effective cost of holding cash; the firm’s
growth potential and maturity; and the reversibility of capital.” Because firms incur
costs when they change levels of debt, it can be optimal for a firm facing financing
friction to have positive stocks of debt and cash simultaneously. In other words,
firms hold cash to avoid incurring costs to adjust the net leverage policy. They ex-
tend their research in a more general risk management set-up in Gamba and Triantis
(2014), where operating flexibility interacts with financial risk management. They
find a critical role for liquidity, whereas value created by derivative hedging could
be low. Alternatively, Rampini and Viswanathan (2010), Rampini and Viswanathan
(2013), and Rampini et al. (2014) assert that both financing and risk management
involve promises to pay that need to be collateralized, resulting in a financing versus
risk management trade-off. They find that more financially constrained firms hedge
less or not at all, and provide evidence for their model prediction empirically by us-
ing panel data from the airline industry. One common feature of these contributions
1Credit line in their paper.
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is that decision makers do not face uncertainty about characteristics of the firm’s
cash flow. Only market friction matters.
A crucial assumption underlying all these models is that agents have perfect
information on the parameters governing those models. In other words, there is no
model uncertainty. However, growing literature shows that model uncertainty might
be common. Early papers that take into account model uncertainty uniformly focus
on uncertainty in profitability. For instance, Pa´stor and Veronesi (2003) and De´-
camps et al. (2005) show that firms make investment decisions in accordance with
their profitability prospects, with or without liquidity friction. The former study also
finds that the stock price increases with uncertainty about average profitability and
decreases over time as the firm learns about its average profitability, which explains
some patterns in our results. The latter paper rigorously shows the importance of
incorporating beliefs into state space, and the non-monotonicity with respect to pa-
rameters on the second order moment2, which is also part of our results. We study
the optimization of risk management strategy of a financially constrained firm when
there is uncertainty about the firm’s hedgeability, while the previous studies focused
on uncertainty about the profitability.
Recently, there have been some successful attempts to integrate uncertainty
in profitability and market friction. Moyen and Platikanov (2013) develop a model
in which shareholders update their beliefs about firms’ quality in a dynamic Tobin’s
q framework. They find evidence that firms with unclear quality are more sensitive
to earnings in their investment decisions than are well-established firms. De´camps
et al. (2015) assume that a firm’s operating cash flow is proportional to profitability,
with dynamics governed by a Geometric Brownian Motion. They find a constant
dividend payout ratio that depends on the long-term prospects of the firm, linking
2Volatility, in their model
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corporate cash management with beliefs. Although only focusing on uncertainty
about the first order moment, these models show the importance of resolving model
uncertainty when facing operational risk in the presence of market friction. Our
model extends the research to the second order moment, which yields more interest-
ing empirical implications.
Our study is more closely related to DeMarzo and Sannikov (2016) and De´-
camps et al. (2015). The former study describes a dynamic contracting model with
learning about a firm’s profitability. Asymmetric information arises endogenously
because by shirking, an entrepreneur can distort the beliefs of investors about the
project’s profitability. The paper studies the relationship between incentives and
learning. In the implementation of the optimal contract, cash inside the firm is ac-
cumulated at no cost. It is shown that liquidation can be a first-best solution, despite
moral hazard. In De´camps et al. (2015), information is incomplete but symmetric
between stakeholders, and holding cash is costly for the firm. The novelty of their
analysis is that they study the evolution of the trade-off between costs and benefits
of holding cash due to learning on the firm’s profitability. The optimal policy is
unique, the dividend payout ratio changes with the beliefs about the profitability,
and liquidation cannot be first-best. They predict that both cash target levels and
target dividend payout ratios increase with profitability prospects.
These recently successful contributions show that, treated separately, model
uncertainty and market friction lead to different nonlinearities between firm value
and its fundamentals, different properties of the dynamics of corporate policy of
the firm. As a result, because these policies neglect the endogeneity between model
uncertainty and market friction, they are incapable to report the main stylized facts
about real world practices. In our paper, we document similar findings, and extend
the study by including corporate hedging as an important alternative for precau-
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tionary cash reserves. Integrating market friction and uncertainty in hedgeability in
a single model is even more challenging because it requires solving a dynamic opti-
mization problem with higher structural complexity. So far as we know, our paper
is the first attempt to address this issue.
This paper offers an alternative explanation for empirical evidence on the dy-
namics of corporate hedging policy and cash management, and their effect on firm
values. Our model resolves the puzzle by suggesting that more endogenous variables
should be taken into account simultaneously when answering this question. Namely,
to what extent do decision makers understand the distributional characteristics –
such as hedgeable risk (correlation between corporate cash flow and traded assets in
financial markets) – of the cash flow of their own business. In this regard, our paper
contributes to the aforementioned literature by associating dynamic corporate risk
management decisions with the resolution of model uncertainty.
This approach yields distinct predictions: more knowledgeable firms separate
themselves from less knowledgeable ones by using more hedge so as to avoid external
financing cost and the cost of carrying cash, thus maximising a firm’s value. Firms
with higher hedgeability tend to assume more hedge without necessarily creating
firm value. Although not done in this paper due to the curse of dimensionality, one
could easily extend this model to other endogenous factors (which were proposed
as alternative answers to our research question, such as the following) to see the
complementary effect of adding learning process to better capture the dynamics in
real-world corporate risk managing behaviours. For example, to address the concern
that financially constrained firms’ financing needs might compete against hedging
needs for limited collateral, raised in Rampini et al. (2014), one should add state-
contingent borrowing as an additional control variable to our model. Although this
paper is mute about corporate investment policy, another interesting extension is to
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endogenise investment decisions, as in Froot et al. (1993). One possible approach
is to replace exogenous cash flows with a capital accumulation model as in Bolton
et al. (2013).
3.3 The Model
We assume a firm generates a stochastic cash flow X1t, and there is a tradable
security with price X2t, correlated with the cash flow of our firm. A perpetual swap
contract with swap price s can be written on X2t. These two variables follow a joint
VAR process, under the risk-neutral probability:

























where xit = logXit, 0 ≤ κi ≤ 1 are the persistence parameters and σi > 0
are the conditional standard deviations, i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, we
restrict the analysis to the case in which the two state variables have positive cor-
relation, ρ ≥ 0, so the firm can enter a long position3 in the swap contract. When
0 < ρ < 1, the swap offers an imperfect hedge against the risk of the firm’s cash flow.
The firm has an overhang of constant payment, A, which could be related to
operating costs, interest payments, or any other costs. In addition, the firm can re-
tain any proportion of the residual cash flow to build up a cash stock ct, which earns
a return rc < rf , where rf is the risk-free rate. The wedge between rc and rf cap-
tures many sources of friction associated with holding cash. The firm incurs distress
3Receiving fixed cash flow
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costs and possibly costly external finance, which is a proportion, λ, to the cash short-
fall, as soon as the cash holdings together with the cash flow cannot meet the cost A.
In principle, model uncertainty regards uncertainty about the entire model
generating the data (cash flow, in our paper). We simplify this by talking about
uncertainty on some parameters, such as: mean, volatility, correlation, and auto-
correlation among others, that characterise the model. In the interest of studying
corporate hedging behaviour, we focus on the uncertainty about correlation, ρ, be-
tween cash flow of the firm and the price of the tradable asset. We assume correlation
can be either high (ρH) or low (ρL). This design captures the hedgeability, namely
the extent to which the firm can hedge its operating risk. High-type firms are those
whose business are more closely related to certain traded assets in the financial mar-
ket, such as oil firms, mining firms, and airlines. On the other hand, low type firms
are usually conglomerates and those with high intangible assets, such as technology
companies. Our choice also makes empirical sense as transaction of high correlation
derivatives is treated differently from that of low correlation in accounting and dis-
closure according to FAS 133 and 161 regulations.
At the beginning, a firm is assigned equal prior probabilities of being high or
low type. The firm then updates the belief about its type, according to Bayes’ rule
based on the observation of cash flows joint (X1, X2). The probability, q
′, that the
firm is of type H given the information at time t is:
q′ =
qPr(x′|H)

















, i ∈ {1, 2} (3.4)
which is the bivariate standard normal probability density function.
A firm can take a long position in a perpetual swap contract. The underlying
asset for the swap is assumed to have the same mean, volatility, and persistence as
the firm’s cash flow in order to lead to simpler interpretation of our results. For
simplicity, the swap price for a unit of product is fixed at s = 1.
Thus, if a firm enters, at time t, into a swap agreement for a notional physical
amount h, at t + 1 the net payoff from the swap is h(s − X2,t+1). Thus, the value
for each unit of this contract for the moment t, excluding counterparty risk and
contractual flexibility at time t, is:






where Fτ (x2,t) = Et[x2,t+τ ] is the forward price at time t for delivery of the as-
set at date t+τ , and the expectation is computed under the risk-neutral probability.
Firms default on the swap when the sum of a firm’s equity value and current
liquidity surplus is less than the promised payment against the swap. Moreover, a
firm can alter its hedging position h. If it does wish to alter its position in the swap,
for example to h′, it redeems the current contract at the par value (St), and enters
into a new agreement at the current fair value denoted SFt, which is discussed in
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the next paragraphs. Hence, the net payoff from the transaction is: h · St − h′ · SFt.
We assume that each transaction entails a negotiation cost, nc, proportional to the
value of the notional amount. As a result, the direct cost of adjusting the hedge is:
nc · (h+ h′).
A no-arbitrage condition requires fair market value of the swap to include
credit charges. Otherwise the swap is under-priced, and firms will take excessive
hedging positions, as on average it will generate extra cash in-flow to the firm.
Consequently, equilibrium hedging positions will be over-represented in the model.
As discussed in Gamba and Triantis (2014), at the inception of the swap agreement,
the fair value of the contract, SFt, reflects both default risk and the option to close
the swap position early at a future date, and thus it can be different from the par
value, St. This implies that there is an indirect cost, h
′ ·SFt−h ·St, associated with
adjusting a swap position at a later date. We assume for simplicity that the bank
selling the swap is not subject to default risk, and thus the only credit charge in the
price of the contract is related to the default risk of the firm. Hence, the fair value


















where Td is the default date, Tp is the date the swap position is closed, and
χ{Td≥Tp} is the indicator function for the event that default happens after the posi-
tion in the swap is closed; in contrast, χ{Td<Tp} indicates the opposite event. RS(·)
is the bank’s recovery value on the swap if the firm defaults, which is explained later.
The first term in equation (3.6) is the present value of the net payoff to the
firm before the firm terminates the swap agreement due either to rebalancing its
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hedge position or to a default. The second term is the payoff to the bank if the firm
either terminates the swap or defaults. The bank is paid the par value in the former
case, and a reduced recovery value in the latter. Td and Tp are stopping times with
respect to the process Xt. Therefore, the fair value of the swap contract depends on
corporate policy. This policy will be determined endogenously.
In order to focus on the question of how firms react to the impact of friction on
firm value, the valuation and associated optimal policies are based on the objective
of equity (firm) value maximisation.4 The value of a firm is represented as:





{qEX [V (X ′, c′, h′, q′)|H ]
+(1− q)EX [V (X ′, c′, h′, q′)|L]}}} (3.7)
where cash flow from the current period is: D = max{d, 0}+min{d, 0}(1+λ).
The pay out is represented as:
d = X1 −A + (1 + rc)c+ h(s−X2,t) + (hSt − h′SFt − nc(h+ h′))χ{h′ 6=h} − c′ (3.8)
where χ{h′ 6=h} is the indicator function of event h
′ 6= h, and EX [·|H/L] is the
expectation conditional on the current state (X) as well as the type.
Default occurs when the second argument in the max operator in Equation
3.7 is non-positive. Upon default, all the remaining cash balance is paid out, the
swap contract is liquidated and settled (h = 0)5
4In practice, corporate risk management decisions are made by managers and subject to the struc-
ture of managerial incentives as well as regulatory policies. We do not attempt to capture these
intricacies in this paper.
5In default, the optimal policy is thus (0; 0) for both hedge position and cash reserve level.
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A bank’s recovery value (RS(·)) on the swap upon default depends on the
firm value at time t+ Td as well as who is the receiver. We have:
RS(X ′) = max
{
−(s−X ′2 + St),
c+ V (X ′, 0, 0, q′)
h
}
per unit of notional amount. The first argument in the max operator is the
cash inflow for the firm, if (s−X ′2+St) > 0. The second argument is the current cash
balance plus the firm value at default, anticipating the cash balance is paid out, and
the swap contract is liquidated and settled (h = 0). For simplicity, we do not dis-
cuss the situation where a firm can strategically default on the swap contract in this
paper. Thus any change on the assumption about what happens if a firm defaults
would have an effect on the calculation of the recovery value (RS(·)). Firstly, the
above assumption is reasonable and realistic, as the U.S. Bankruptcy Code allows
financial swaps’ counterparties to exercise contractual rights and get paid ahead of
debt obligations. Secondly, even the bankruptcy law could be different globally, the
distinction enters the recovery value in the second argument in terms of different
level of remaining firm value. In general, a stricter bankruptcy law with respect to
swap counterparties would divert more firm value out of the firm and thus lower
the continuation value of the firm. This would in turn increases the indirect cost of
hedging and consequently reduces the use of hedge. On the contrary, a bankruptcy
law that better protects swap counterparties would encourage hedging activity, ce-
teris paribus.
The entire model accommodates an underlying mechanism that firms with
better knowledge can more accurately manage their cash flow risk, thus creating
more value from corporate risk management. While keeping the spirit of the model
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in Gamba and Triantis (2014), our model largely differs from theirs by focusing on
the effect of dynamic resolution of model uncertainty. We aim to answer a different
research question which is whether the uncertainty in hedgeability drives a young
firm’s risk management policy to differ from that of a mature firm. We also discard
devices that are less relevant to our research purpose, such as operational flexibility.
Consequently, both risk management policy and firm value directly or indirectly de-
pend on the learning process. Thus, mature, large firms are usually knowledgeable
firms and young, small firms are uninformed firms, leading to the observed relation-
ship between enterprise value and risk management policy.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Parameter values
{Insert Table 3.1 here.}
We calibrated the model to obtain results that help explain existing empirical
evidence and provide empirical implications. The rationale for each of the param-
eter choices is described below. In many cases, e.g., high- or low-type correlation
ρH/ρL, the parameter selection corresponds directly to typical values found in the
literature. In other cases, we set parameters such that moments of key variables
from our simulations are consistent with those in empirical studies, such as equity
issuance frequency.
The standard deviation and persistence parameters of the log of cash flow are
set to σ1 = 15% and κ1 = 0.8, which are consistent with the range of values used in
recent articles with similar processes (e.g. Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Gamba
and Triantis (2014)). The profitability is also affected by the fixed production cost
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A = 0.85, which could be pinned down by matching observed frequency of equity
issuance. In a coarse measurement, Fama and French (2005) estimate the number
to be between 54% to 72%, using firms’ net equity issuance. However, this includes
equity issuance due to M&A and management compensation, which accounts for
more than half the observations. More reasonable measurements range between
13% and 17.9% (Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Hennessy et al., 2007; Gustafson and
Iliev, 2015). Hennessy and Whited (2007) indicates simulated frequency of issuance
could be higher than its empirical counterpart. In their study, simulated frequency
is 23.05%, while the observed is 17.5%.
The underlying asset for the swap is assumed to have the same mean, standard
deviation, and persistence as the cash flow in order to lead to simpler interpretation
of our results. The swap price is fixed at the median of X2, s = 1. However, we
ran robustness checks in a range (0.95, 1.05)6 around the baseline case. Similar to
Gamba and Triantis (2014), this does not qualitatively change the conclusion. They
also test an alternative approach where the swap price is reset every time the hedging
position is renegotiated, such that the fair market value of the new initiated swap is
zero. They find that firm valuation is not sensitive to the specification of the swap
price. We point out that as long as the swap is fairly priced, taking default risk into
account, the swap price becomes irrelevant.
In our model, X1 represents the entire risk exposure of our firm, and the
correlation ρ measures the ability of the firm to hedge this risk exposure using the
derivatives contract. We believe that for many non-financial corporations, this cor-
relation is likely to be quite low based on the empirical evidence, ranging from
3% to 45% summarised from a group of leading empirical papers, such as Tufano
(1996), Guay and Kothari (2003), Bartram et al. (2010), and Campello et al. (2011).
6chosen based on the properties of the process underlying the swap
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Conversely, for firms whose businesses relate to natural resources, agriculture, and
finance, this correlation could be very high as Carter et al. (2006) and Rampini et al.
(2014) point out.
The interest rate is assumed to be r = 5%, whereas returns on holding cash
are rc = 3%. In other words, there is a cost of carrying cash by assuming that
cash reserves earn a constant interest rate rc < r inside the firm. Consequently,
the difference between r and rc is a carry cost of liquidity. This design is consistent
with extant literature, where two main concerns associated with holding cash are
taken into account. The first cost of carrying cash comes from direct loss of interest
tax. On the other hand, holding cash implicitly incurs opportunity cost for forgoing
positive NPV investment projects. Morellec et al. (2014) assume the cost of holding
cash is r − rc = 2%, which produces empirically consistent simulation results. We
use a smaller cost (1%), as it yields a better match with the empirical cash ratio as
in Sa´nchez and Yurdagul (2013) under our model setting.
The scarce availability of derivatives instruments that closely meet particular
firms’ hedging needs is one major reason why the ability of using derivatives to re-
duce a firm’s risk exposures appears to be weak in practice. These firms constitute
the low-type group in our model. We also note that certain industries, such as nat-
ural resources, are highly related to widely traded financial derivatives. We assume
{ρH , ρL} = {0.9, 0.1} as our base case, to make a sharp contrast in the results be-
tween high and low type, which helps to highlight the main interest of this paper.
In the next subsection, we will show that these parameters yield empirically com-
patible values for the magnitude of hedging positions. We also conducted sensitivity
analyses across a wide spectrum of correlation values and found similar results.7
7However the distance between high and low correlation does affect the speed of learning, and
entangles with a discretisation approach, which increases numerical complexity.
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When a firm is caught in distress, it has to pay a significant premium to raise
capital to cover the shortfall. This additional distress cost (λ) is assumed to be
proportional to the deficit amount, which is assumed to be 15%. This may reflect
the need to sell assets at a discount in fire sales, or to assume costly covenants in
contracts for external finance. Pulvino (1998) estimates the fire-sale discount to be
about 14%. In the model developed by Strebulaev (2007), the range of distress costs
is set between 5 − 25%, whose mid-point is around 15%. Our assumption of 15%
is close to both of them. All of our base case parameters are shown in Table 3.1,
which are similar to those examined in Gamba and Triantis (2014).
3.4.2 Numerical solution and simulation
In this paper, the uncertainty surrounds one important distributional characteristic,
correlation of hedging assets with the cash flow. Particularly, this incomplete infor-
mation determines how well a firm could hedge away the risk associated with its cash
flow. That is why in this paper, we refer to this as hedgeability. A high correlation
would result in more effective hedge. At the beginning, the firm assigns equal prior
probabilities of having high or low correlation. The firm then updates beliefs about
its type following Bayes’ rule, using information conveyed in each realization of the
state variables.
In order to gain more insight into the effect of learning on the dynamics of
hedging and cash policies, as well as the valuation of firms, we show how the optimal
policy function is found by numerically solving a firm’s problem in Section 3.3, and
how it drives the dynamics of corporate hedging and cash management policy. See
Appendix A for further details on the numerical method.
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Baseline models
{Insert Table 3.2 here.}
We set off from a baseline model (Model 1), where firms have perfect informa-
tion, cash reserves are not allowed, and cash flows are perfectly correlated with the
price of hedging assets. These are factors that interact with a firm’s risk management
policy. We then gradually relaxed one restriction at a time, so that we could have a
clean view on the individual effect of each aspect of the model. Specifically, in Model
2 we allowed for a more realistic imperfect correlation between the underlying assets
of a swap and the cash flow of the firm. In Model 3, we further allowed for cash
reserves, as an alternative risk management tool. The results are presented in Table
3.2. Here we only present steady-state values of each metric. However, we notice
that it takes some time to reach the steady state from an initial condition, especially
when cash holding is allowed. We will discuss this evolution in later paragraphs.
Comparing the first and second column of Table 3.2, the hedge level decreases
in Model 2, as the hedging asset – cash flow correlation becomes imperfect, specif-
ically from 1 to 0.9. This is reasonable; while hedging becomes less accurate, the
first-best solution is no longer achievable. As discussed previously, optimal hedging
policy depends on distributional characteristics. Stochastically, external financing
cost is inevitably triggered with a probability larger than zero. This is also mani-
fested in a lower firm value, higher distress probability, and larger deadweight loss.
We shall note that although frequency of external financing is the only observ-
able variable in the real world, we are more interested in the decomposition of total
equity issuance for different purposes. We thus probed the relationship between risk
management and external financing probability from a more strategic perspective.
On one hand, firms resort to external finance in the face of financial distress. On the
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other hand, firms might be willing to raise external finance, even in good economic
states with no operating cash flow shortfall, to meet the liquidity need in hard times
so as to establish an optimal risk management position, an equilibrium in the trade-
off between expected cost of risk management (including the cost of carrying cash)
and that of external financing.
We therefore separated actual financial distress, due to the realisation of cash
flow for the current period and risk management decisions made in the last period,
from the aggregate external financing situations. This decomposition, as indicated
in Table 3.2, shows that a considerable proportion of aggregate external financing
is caused by voluntary equity issuance due to liquidity needs so as to fulfill the
risk management decision in current period, to establish optimal hedging position.
Moreover, we note that this effect differs across all three models in Table 3.2. The
proportion decreases with correlation between a firm’s cash flow and the underlying
assets of the swap, and increases with the ability to reserve cash. Specifically, the
frequency of actual distress in Model 3, as a result of corporate operation, decreased
to as low as 0.56%.
Therefore, one interesting implication here is that rather than gross external
financing frequency, which we usually observe in the real world and is widely used
in empirical studies, researchers should distinguish actual financial distress from
voluntary equity issuance. We suggest empirical researchers use more subtle identi-
fication of external financing when studying corporate policy. Some pioneering work
is already heading for this direction. For example, DeAngelo et al. (2010) find that
62.6% issuers of an SEO would have run out of cash the year after the SEO without
the proceeds from the SEO.
We further allowed cash stock in Model 3, presented in the third column,
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holding correlation coefficient unchanged at ρ = 0.9, as in Model 2. Consequently,
firms reserve substantial amounts of cash and reduce the use of hedges. This result
indicates a substitution effect between hedge and cash balance. Being equipped with
cash as another risk management tool, firms are now able to further reduce their
distress probability, as well as the total external equity issuance rate. Consequently,
loss is mitigated and enterprise value is enhanced.
Although not reported, a similar analysis was also conducted on unlimited li-
ability firms. We found higher use of hedges which is not surprising, because limited
liability serves as a natural risk management device and reduces the use of other
risk management tools. This value enhancement comes from the option that limited
liability firms can default in bad states while hoping on a better prospect in good
states. Since the downside is bounded but not the upside, such firms’ values are
larger than the value of firms who must bear all the losses even when the firm is a
negative asset. In this regard, although not discussed explicitly in this paper, our
model implies a positive relationship between risk-shifting effects in corporate risk
management strategy and leverage. Since the main interest of this paper is to study
how knowledge affects a firm’s risk management, we leave the study of the leverage
to future research.
{Insert Figure 3.1 here.}
We probed other important dynamics not illustrated in Table 3.2, as well as
compared High-type dynamics with Low-type dynamics. As shown in Table 3.3, we
note an increasing pattern in cash stock in both H- and L-types. Since we have not
yet introduced model uncertainty, these dynamics are likely caused by the physical
ability to accumulate a desired level of cash balance. For example, the mean of op-
erating profit, E(X˜)−A, is 0.18 per period. In addition, external financing is costly.
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Thus, to establish the optimal cash balance, which is above 0.5 for both types, takes
time. To address this concern, we endowed firms with a steady-state cash balance
to adjust for this dynamic pattern not caused by learning in order to comment on
the effect of learning. In addition, we conducted sensitivity analyses on the carrying
cost of cash, and found results remain in a reasonable range of the cost.
Furthermore, we observed distinct strategies between H-type and L-type firms.
H-type firms use more hedge to manage its operating risk naturally following its bet-
ter capability of accurately matching operating cash flow with price of the underlying
asset of the swap. In contrast, due to too much noise in hedging, L-type firms use a
lower level of hedge. We also note a lower distress probability and external financing
loss for H-type firms, but the pattern in enterprise value is less clear.
When we allow for a cash balance in Model 3, relative to the cases without
it, we give the firm an option to smooth over time (as opposed to across states) the
cost of risk management. Firms do this by issuing equity as soon as they can, and
storing cash in the firm, to the extent that the cost of carrying cash outweighs its
expected marginal benefit. At the moment it costs 1.4%, which is consistent with
extant literature and yields empirically consistent cash ratio. We also show it is
indeed costly to firms, as they tend to reduce cash reserves rather than raise them
through issuing equity, when endowed with steady-state cash balances.
We also noticed distinct relationships between the use of two risk management
tools, hedging and cash reserves, for H- and L-type firms. Particularly, we observed
a substitution effect in H-type firms, but a complementary effect in L-type firms.
While cash stock increased over time in both types, the use of hedge decreases for
H-type but not so for L-type. However, we found this observed pattern depended
on the cost of holding cash. As discussed in the previous paragraph, if the carrying
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cost is low, firms would prefer issuing equity as soon as possible and storing the
raised capital as cash. Firms can thus afford more hedging because they have more
collateral represented by cash holdings, which is the only tangible asset of a firm in
our model; this follows the same logic as in Rampini et al. (2014). Therefore, the
observed pattern is determined by the trade-off between a complementary effect of
cash, serving as collateral so as to afford more hedging, and a substitution effect,
when the cost of holding cash is large.
Consequently, the substitution effect detected in H-type firms indicates that
the cost consideration of holding cash dominates the collateral argument for firms
who could more effectively hedge their risks, whereas the complementary effect docu-
mented in L-type firms suggest reserving cash (collateral) is more beneficial in terms
of establishing the optimal risk management strategy. The total effect from this
corporate risk management strategy is enhanced, evidenced by declining frequency
of distress and external financing loss.
Effect of model uncertainty
To separate the effect due to model uncertainty, we need two benchmark models.
The first is Model 3, with no model uncertainty. The second model faces model
uncertainty but we simulate a counterfactual scenario where firms do not learn from
jointly realised cash flow and the price of hedging assets. Particularly, the prior
belief is not updated thus remaining 0.5 through all simulated 50 years. We name
this the uninformed model in the following discussion. While the first benchmark
model is the standard benchmark model in previous literature, the second one is usu-
ally ignored, such as in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2016) and De´camps et al. (2015).
However, inclusion of the second benchmark model is meaningful in this paper. We
focus not only on the loss due to model uncertainty when compared to the first-best
scenario model, which is the main interest of previous study, but also on the effect
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and value of the ability to learn. Moreover, we include an additional model where
a firm has a known correlation equal to the expected level under ’neutral belief’,
i.e. ρ = 0.5, to further illustrate the effects of parameter uncertainty. We name this
the expected model. For a fair comparison, we grant firms steady-state cash as an
endowment.
{Insert Figure 3.2 here.}
Figure 3.2 summarises and helps us understand the main message of this sec-
tion. We observed that risk management strategies from a learning model are mostly
bounded between those from a perfect knowledge model and those from an unin-
formed model. As knowledge approaches perfect, this deviation decays and finally
vanishes in the long-run. Particularly, we found that a learning H-type firm generally
uses less (more) hedge than its first-best counterpart (an uninformed firm). However,
the H-type firm stores more (less) cash than it would do in the first-best (uninformed)
scenario. This inversion supports the hypothesis that model uncertainty works in
the direction of an increasing substitution effect between risk management tools, as
a higher cash reserve would otherwise result in higher hedging if it worked in favour
of complementarity.
However, a complementary effect is also evidenced in the lagged hedging with
respect to cash reserves. As in Figure 3.2, cash grows from the first year, whereas
hedging picks up in the third year. After initiating hedging, cash balance decreases
to a stable level and is further reduced in the long-run. This indicates that a sub-
stantial level of cash stock is optimal to start hedging. This complementary effect
is explained by cash’s collateral role as in Rampini et al. (2014), and does not rely
on model uncertainty. As shown in Figure 3.2, all three models exhibit the same
complementary effect in the first few years. This might explain why an uninformed
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model also exhibits an increasing pattern in hedge in the first few years.
{Insert Figure 3.3 here.}
A similar pattern is documented for L-type firms as shown in Figure 3.3. As in
the H-type case, the level of hedge in learning models is bounded between the other
two benchmark models, and as knowledge approaches perfect status, firms’ hedging
positions approach those in the perfect knowledge model – monotonic with respect
to belief. In L-type firms, cash reserves are always preferred. Thus, we observe a
smaller difference in cash between all three models for L-type firms.
Rather than H-type learning firms, who use insufficient hedge but excessive
cash, L-type learning firms instead abuse hedge and build up an inadequate level of
cash. Therefore, as we have observed in the H-type scenario, there is an inversion
in the combination of hedge and cash for a learning L-type firm with respect to
its perfect knowledge counterpart. Namely, while a learning firm holds less cash, it
uses more hedge than a perfect knowledge firm. This supports our previous claim
that model uncertainty enhances the substitution effect. Again, we documented the
model-uncertainty-independent complementarity in the first few years in all models
as in the H-type scenario. We also find that when a firm has a know level of corre-
lation, which equals to the expected level of ’neutral belief’, it would use less hedge
but more cash comparing to a H-type learning firm and less cash comparing to a
L-type learning firm. This makes sense as hedging becomes more effective when the
correlation goes to one. This finding also evidences the substitution effect, as when
hedging is less effective, a firm has to reserve more cash to weather the bad states
of the world.
{Insert Table 3.5 here.}
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{Insert Table 3.6 here.}
We also tabulated the evolution in Table 3.5 for H-type firms and in Table
3.6 for L-type firms. First, the patterns of using risk management tools observed in
the perfect knowledge model were confirmed in the model uncertainty scenario, e.g.
H-type firms use more hedge and enjoy less frequent distress and external financing
loss than L-type firms in the steady state.
Second, the levels of hedge in learning models are bounded between those
of perfect knowledge model and those of an uninformed model. As the knowledge
approaches perfect status in the learning model, the results approach those in the
perfect knowledge model. Since the hedging level of informed firms is higher than
that of uninformed firms, this observation leads to the implication that H-type firms’
hedging positions increase with belief.
When model uncertainty is integrated into the model, as in Table 3.5 and
Table 3.6, H-type firms quickly increase their hedge in the first few years when
knowledge is largely improved, and results in a higher hedging position in the long-
run. In contrast, L-type firms use much less hedge. Since upon maturity the H-type
firms take on more hedge, it is consistent with our previous claim that a firm with
better knowledge about the hedgeability of its business will prefer hedge to minimize
cost incurred by financial distress in bad states.
This is intuitively reasonable as mature firms are the firms who have learned
their hedgeability through many years of operation, and thus are able to make the
best use of hedging instruments while keeping hedging cost low. This interpretation
answers Stulz (1996), where he retrospected “[t]he actual corporate use of deriva-
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tives, however, does not seem to correspond closely to the theory ... large companies
make far greater use of derivatives than small firms, even though small firms have
more volatile cash flows, more restricted access to capital, and thus presumably more
reason to buy protection against financial trouble”. Note that although the model
setting is mostly linear due to the parsimony of our model, non-monotonicity and
non-linearity could still emerge when sources of friction such as external financing
cost and tax are introduced, as in Gamba and Triantis (2008).
Cash might be one of the most subtle variables in corporate risk management.
Firms actively change their cash balance level over time. Decreases in cash balance
usually occur if the firm draws on internal liquidity to overcome low profitability,
and if the firm builds up a hedging position. Increases in cash balance enable the
firm to weather negative cash flow shocks, as well as to provide additional liquidity
for future establishment of hedge, particularly if the cash balance has been drawn
down. Although our results show that the cash stock remains substantial even if
the cash flow and price of underlying asset of hedging derivatives is almost perfectly
correlated – ρ is as high as 0.9 indicating cash holding is an indispensable method
of corporate risk management – there are important limitations. First, there is a
cost associated with holding cash. Second, persistent unfavourable states will grad-
ually deplete a firm’s cash stock, even if it was substantial. Distress costs will then
be triggered with some probability. Alternatively, to build up a large cash balance
requires the firm either to yield a sufficient string of positive cash flows or to raise
costly external finance, which might not be possible. Having analysed cases in which
cash stock is beneficial but costly, we might be able to explain why firms store more
cash in case of need during bad states of the world, given hedging effect could be
very noisy due to imperfect knowledge during the early stage. A discussion of cash
continues in the next section, where results from models with different risk manage-
ment tools are presented.
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Thus, we conclude that the previously described features stand out from ex-
tant literature as they raise distinct predictions of model uncertainty in the presence
of learning: corporate hedging position increases with belief that its operating cash
flow is highly correlated with the price of underlying asset of derivatives designated
as a hedge; high correlation firms use more hedge than low correlation firms; and
cash’s role in corporate risk management is more sophisticated than has been stud-
ied in previous literature. This separation might be the reason for mixed empirical
findings, if they did not control for knowledge accumulation of firms.
Finally, we need to point out that statistically, although large, mature firms
are usually knowledgeable firms and small, young firms are uninformed firms, the
merit of this paper stems from separating these surface characteristics of firms from
the intrinsic driver of the use of cash and hedge – the accumulation of knowledge.
3.5 Discussions
Marginal effect of individual risk management tool
In this section, we further probe the marginal effect of each risk management tool,
i.e. hedging with swap or cash, by studying three additional models: one benchmark
model with no risk management at all, one with only cash reserve as risk manage-
ment tool, and one with only the swap contract defined in Section 3.3. Together
with the full model with both hedge and cash analysed in Subsection 3.4.2, we were
able to quantify the marginal effect of individual risk managing devices when model
uncertainty is gradually resolved.
{Insert Figure 3.4, 3.5 and Table 3.7, 3.8 here.}
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As illustrated by Figure 3.4 and 3.5 with details in Table 3.7 and 3.8, H-type
firms tend to hedge more when this is the only risk management method, whereas
L-type firms use slightly less hedge under the same scenario. This implies that the
complementary effect of cash is more outstanding for L-type firms, while the substi-
tution effect dominates in the case of H-type firms. However, even for H-type firms,
these two effects coexist, as we observed that in the first few years, firms equipped
with dual risk management tools were able to increase their hedging positions more
quickly with the aid of retained cash. Having access to hedging relieved both firm
types’ cash demand, indicating hedging substitutes for cash stock in models with
uncertainty. These patterns make our previous hypothesis about the coexistence of
both substitution and complementary relationship clear. Therefore, the coexistence
of both substitutionary and supplementary effects suggest neither of these risk man-
agement tools is dispensable, as was claimed in Gamba and Triantis (2014).
As indicated in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8, we found that either risk manage-
ment tool does reduce loss caused by external financing costs. Particularly, when
comparing the fourth panel in both tables, while cash has very similar effect in re-
ducing loss for both firm types, hedge is much more efficient for H-type firms. This
is consistent with one of our hypotheses: hedge is more valuable to H-type firms.
Finally, we present an interesting finding of this subsection. Our results might
shed light on the mixed empirical evidence on the value creation of hedging. Under
our main parameter settings, as shown in Table 3.4.1, hedging by itself seems not to
increase firm value for both H- and L-type firms, as illustrated in the third panel of
Figure 3.4 and 3.5. Due to numerical reasons, particularly the discretisation and the
curse of dimensionality, limited points on the mesh grid result in enterprise values
in no-hedging model sometimes outrun those in hedge-only model. This situation
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could be mitigated by using finer grid, although we keep the number of points on the
mesh grid of the most complicated model, i.e. the model with both cash and hedging
as well as uncertainty to ensure comparison across tables. However, while firm value
does not seem to be affected greatly, the difference in correlation does create distinct
corporate risk management strategies, as H-type firms hedge substantially more than
their L-type peers. This is consistent with empirical research, mentioned in previous
sections, that finds no evidence for hedging creating firm value. The next subsection
presents results of some sensitivity analyses on the factors that might affect firm
value.
Discussion on value creation by hedging
In the previous sections, we found little value creation or even little value destroyed
when firms can hedge. On one hand, we contribute to the literature by showing that
mixed empirical evidence on firm value created by hedging is theoretically possible
under reasonably calibrated parameters. On the other hand, another research ques-
tion naturally raises itself – what might affect the value creation of hedging? In this
section, we present the results of several sensitivity checks on parameters that might
affect firm value through hedging. We also compared the results with those from an
unlimited liability firm model. The results are summarised in Table 3.9. We found
that the tested parameters change firm value in a non-monotonic fashion. Moreover,
whether hedging creates value for a limited liability firm depends on the trade-off
between expected savings on friction (external financing costs, in our paper) and
losses in default option value.
We speculate that parameters affecting profitability, hedging technology, break
points, and the curvature of cost function, as well as capital structure and firms’
financial liability, might also affect firm value creation. We altered one of these pa-
rameters at a time and compared the firm value of a no-risk-management firm and
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a hedging-only firm, i.e., no cash reserves. The difference is the value created or
destroyed by hedging, because the two firms are otherwise identical.
Because profitability has a first order influence on firm value, whenever we
altered some other parameter, for example distress costs, we repeated the calcula-
tion of firm value for each profitability level. Therefore, each column in Table 3.9
presents firm values of different overhang cost (A), with all other parameters and
settings remaining the same.
{Insert Table 3.9 here.}
Each panel in Table 3.9 represents a change to other parameters. In the first
panel, the distress costs were increased to .5 to create a larger hedging demand.
We observes slight value creation when the overhang cost (A) is low, .85 and .9, but
larger value destruction when it is .95 or .97. This indicates that higher distress costs
do not guarantee firm value creation. However, many previous papers take the point
of view that the larger the downside costs, the larger the amount that hedging could
save and consequently increase the firm value. Interestingly, this firm value creation
- destruction is non-monotonic with respect to profitability. We observe some firms
do not manage their risk at all, because in the most extreme case, when they are
financially constrained and close to bankruptcy, risk shifting would dominate their
risk management choice. This is evidenced by Rampini et al. (2014), who find a
risk-shifting behaviour in small, financially constrained airlines who “hedge less or
not at all.” Similar results are also found when we mute renegotiation costs applied
on the adjustment of hedging position from 1%.
In a separate test in which we added constant debt into the model (results not
reported here), we note that the value creation - destruction is much less when no
77
leverage is compared to that in a moderately levered scenario, even if we maximised
the firm value instead of equity value.
As implied by the non-monotonicity and changes due to capital structure, we
finally verify and conclude that limited liability plays the major role in firm value
creation – destruction due to corporate risk management, especially by hedging. In
the last panel, simply removing limited liability restores firm value creation as pre-
dicted by classic corporate risk management literature.
So far, both sides of empirical literature are supported by our model. The rea-
son is that whether hedging creates value or not depends on firm characteristics such
as profitability as well as market conditions, such as external financing costs, and
regulations on bankruptcy. These factors determine the structure of the combined
cost function and the value function of the default option. Consequently, optimal
firm value is decided by the trade-off between reducing expected external financing
cost and increasing the real option value of the firm.
This mechanism could be understood by revisiting the trade-off which deter-
mines firm value. On one hand, a firm could increase its value by actively managing
its downside risk so as to mitigate expected external financing losses. As a result,
high correlation firms better control their operating risk with lower deadweight losses,
caused by shortfall in cash flow due to stochastic realisation and risk management
decisions made in both the preceding and current periods. As a natural consequence,
enterprise value is created from the improvement in efficiency of hedging. On the
other hand, risk management is costly. Implicitly, given limited liability, assuming
certain risk could be value enhancing under certain circumstance. This trade-off
entangles with substitution – complementary relationships between hedge and cash
reserve in our model, which are analysed in previous sections.
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3.6 Conclusion
Using a dynamic model, we find that model uncertainty can affect corporate risk
management policy. In this paper, the particular uncertainty lies in the correlation
between a firm’s cash flow and the price of the underlying asset of a swap, which the
firm uses to hedge its risk. The resolution of uncertainty in correlation drives distinct
dynamics of corporate risk management strategies of different firms. Namely, a firm
with better hedgeability prospects tends to increase the use of hedge whilst firms
believed to have low hedgeability rely relatively more on cash, and we prove it is
not due to the accumulation of liquidity. We also identify both the substitutionary
effect and complementary effect between hedging and cash stock. Particularly, cash’s
collateral effect is more pronouncing in high correlation firms, resulting a higher
hedging position for these firms. Albeit diverse choices in hedging policy and cash
management policy, the difference in firm value could be small under reasonable
range of parameters. We argue that both optimal corporate risk management policy
and resulted firm value not only depends on the trade-off between minimising costs
associated with market friction and minimising costs incurred by managing risk,
but also the trade-off between maximising the net benefits from risk management
and maximising the value of default option. In this regard, this paper might help
explain why young firms are observed to use less hedge than mature firms and
shed light on understanding mixed evidence on the value creation role of hedging.
Although this paper does not touch the strategic entering into a new market, it is
interesting to further probe the idea that an entering firm could learn not only from
the operational results of itself but also from observing others. An educated guess
would be that the information from peers’ operation could pass through correlation
with the operational results of the entering firm, or constantly raise the prior belief
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- both accelerate the speed of the resolution of uncertainty.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Appendix:Numerical Methods
We solve the Bellman equation described in Section 3.3 by simulating 1,000 firms
over 50 years. Each path for the state variable x is obtained by iterating Equation
(3.1) using Monte Carlo simulation, for 50 time steps. The simulated paths for x
are restricted to a set of discrete values x˜, following the Tauchen (1986) approach.
Due to the curse of dimensionality, the number of sampling points is chosen to be
19 as a result of trade-off between accuracy and efficiency. However, we ran special
tests to guarantee that this choice of grid size yields simulation results with errors
in the relevant moments (mean, volatility and correlation) that are within 1% of
their theoretical counterparts. For robustness, we also have a finer grid and find
very similar results.
Particularly, we discretise the sets of h, c and q respectively in [0, hu], [0, cu]
and [0, 1] with 31 equally spaced points. The variables x1 and x1 define a reduced-
form vector autoregression that we approximate through a discrete-state Markov
chain with 11 points for each variable with truncated support in [−3σuj , 3σuj ], j = 1, 2,
where σuj = σj/
√
1− κ2 is the unconditional standard deviation for j = 1, 2. The
discrete abscissae and the risk-neutral Markov transition probabilities are computed
according to the method proposed by Terry and Knotek (2011), which is based on
the Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule, as in Tauchen (1986), but allows for non-zero
correlation.
A Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate a sample path for the firm
following an optimal policy. We generate a sequence of 500,000 independent draws
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from a truncated bivariate Normal distribution and generated a path for x1 and x2
using the AR(1) specification. Starting from an initial condition (h0, c0, q0), we apply
the optimal policy from Equation 3.7 and generate a simulated path for the firm.
We drop the first 200 observations, to exclude any influence of the initial condition.
In the event the firm defaults, a new firm starts business with neutral belief and
with no financial hedging in place (h = 0, c = 0).
3.7.2 Appendix:Figures and Tables
σi annual volatility of xi 15%
ρH correlation for high type 0.9
ρL correlation for low type 0.1
κi persistence of xi 0.8
s swap price of the swap contract 1
A fixed production cost 0.88
rc return on cash 3.6%
rf annual risk-free rate 5%
λ distress cost 15%
rc renegotiation cost 1%
Table 3.1: Parameter Values
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Hedge 0.2969 0.2229 0.1679
Cash - - 0.5458
EV 4.1738 3.9686 4.0690
Equity Issue 0.2166 0.3109 0.1501
Distress 0.1822 0.2520 0.0584
Loss 0.0012 0.0028 0.0008
Table 3.2: Simulation results of baseline models with no model uncertainty
Each column in this table presents the average of up to seven metrics from three baseline
models, with one restriction relaxed at each time. The metrics are: the level of hedge;
the cash balance; the firm/enterprise value of the firm; the frequency of external equity
financing, the frequency of financial distress; and external financing loss. Model 1 is the
baseline model without cash and perfect correlation; in Model 2, firms’ cash flows become
imperfectly correlated; and finally Model 3 adds cash as an alternative risk management
tool. In this table, size of mesh grid is 11× 31× 21 (cash flow × hedging position × cash
holding). The other parameters are given in Table 3.1.
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age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
H type
Hedge 0.1039 0.1836 0.1832 0.1834 0.1783 0.1695 0.1686
Cash 0.1925 0.3744 0.4565 0.4954 0.5079 0.5349 0.4952
EV 4.0764 4.0489 4.0293 4.0342 4.0302 4.0881 4.0745
Equity Issue 0.2727 0.2273 0.2000 0.1827 0.1740 0.1487 0.1679
Distress 0.1510 0.1170 0.0980 0.0827 0.0703 0.0590 0.0727
Loss 0.0037 0.0015 0.0013 0.0011 0.0010 0.0008 0.0011
Default 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
L type
Hedge 0.0277 0.0756 0.0925 0.0986 0.0935 0.0951 0.0898
Cash 0.2000 0.4195 0.5230 0.5709 0.5895 0.6156 0.5682
EV 4.0469 4.0350 4.0276 4.0265 4.0234 4.0774 4.0635
Equity Issue 0.3043 0.2862 0.2509 0.2254 0.2352 0.2045 0.2216
Distress 0.1769 0.1652 0.1251 0.1120 0.1089 0.0835 0.1001
Loss 0.0027 0.0032 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024 0.0018 0.0021
Default 0.0007 0.0030 0.0013 0.0020 0.0010 0.0014 0.0015
Table 3.3: H vs L, with cash, no model uncertainty
For Model 3, this table presents the evolution of the average of six metrics: the level of hedge;
the cash balance; the firm/enterprise value of the firm; the frequency of external equity financing,
the frequency of financial distress; and external financing loss. They are tabulated against years,
with each column reports the average metrics during the corresponding years. The final column
presents the unconditional mean of the entire simulated sample. In this table, the size of mesh grid
is 11× 31× 21× 31 (cash flow × cash holding × hedging position × beliefs). The other parameters
are given in Table 3.1.
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age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
H type
Hedge 0.0657 0.1321 0.1583 0.1672 0.1646 0.1723 0.1617
Cash 0.1932 0.3809 0.4701 0.5058 0.5116 0.5343 0.4970
EV 4.0732 4.0578 4.0221 4.0234 4.0400 4.0619 4.0562
Equity Issue 0.2421 0.2338 0.1965 0.1807 0.1640 0.1458 0.1635
Distress 0.1807 0.1412 0.1000 0.0864 0.0728 0.0602 0.0773
Loss 0.0045 0.0022 0.0014 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0012
Default 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Belief 0.6645 0.8034 0.8840 0.9392 0.9733 0.9981 0.9537
L type
Hedge 0.0439 0.0974 0.1026 0.1041 0.0987 0.0973 0.0948
Cash 0.1995 0.4181 0.5203 0.5710 0.5894 0.6126 0.5658
EV 4.0228 4.0120 4.0165 4.0071 3.9988 4.0586 4.0442
Equity Issue 0.2844 0.2755 0.2450 0.2244 0.2332 0.2039 0.2188
Distress 0.1701 0.1573 0.1213 0.1096 0.1054 0.0834 0.0985
Loss 0.0026 0.0029 0.0024 0.0023 0.0022 0.0018 0.0020
Default 0.0007 0.0038 0.0014 0.0021 0.0014 0.0015 0.0016
Belief 0.1532 0.0405 0.0102 0.0038 0.0013 0.0010 0.0135
Table 3.4: H vs L, with model uncertainty
For the full model, this table presents the evolution of the average of six metrics: the level of hedge;
the cash balance; the firm/enterprise value of the firm; the frequency of external equity financing,
the frequency of financial distress; and external financing loss. They are tabulated against years,
with each column reports the average metrics during the corresponding years. The final column
presents the unconditional mean of the entire simulated sample. In this table, the size of mesh grid
is 11× 31× 21× 31 (cash flow × cash holding × hedging position × beliefs). The other parameters
are given in Table 3.1.
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Hedge
age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
Informed 0.0669 0.1408 0.1550 0.1624 0.1611 0.1678 0.1585
Learner 0.0590 0.1194 0.1410 0.1494 0.1531 0.1706 0.1565
Uninformed 0.0362 0.0737 0.0792 0.0769 0.0772 0.0846 0.0797
Belief 0.6645 0.8034 0.8840 0.9392 0.9733 0.9981 0.9537
Cash
Informed 0.5957 0.5694 0.5673 0.5651 0.5485 0.5410 0.5497
Learner 0.6034 0.5825 0.5808 0.5767 0.5554 0.5413 0.5531
Uninformed 0.6286 0.6226 0.6238 0.6226 0.6079 0.6054 0.6102
Enterprise Value
Informed 4.1275 4.1067 4.0651 4.0621 4.0742 4.0905 4.0895
Learner 4.0933 4.0799 4.0392 4.0397 4.0513 4.0634 4.0626
Uninformed 4.0831 4.0690 4.0319 4.0330 4.0462 4.0630 4.0598
Loss
Informed 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008
Learner 0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008
Uninformed 0.0005 0.0013 0.0013 0.0015 0.0013 0.0014 0.0013
Table 3.5: Effect of learning, H-type
For H-type, this table compares the average of four metrics: the level of cash balance, the hedge,
enterprise value of the firm, and the deadweight loss across three models: ignorant, learning and
perfect knowledge, as described in Subsection 3.4.2. They are tabulated against years of learning.
The final column presents the unconditional mean of the entire simulated sample. In this table,
the size of mesh grid is 11× 31× 21× 31 (cash flow × cash holding × hedging position × beliefs).
The other parameters are given in Table 3.1.
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Hedge
age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
Informed 0.0360 0.0757 0.0873 0.0910 0.0864 0.0935 0.0879
Learner 0.0471 0.0894 0.0960 0.0960 0.0891 0.0952 0.0916
Uninformed 0.0489 0.1064 0.1141 0.1197 0.1118 0.1192 0.1134
Belief 0.1532 0.0404 0.0101 0.0038 0.0013 0.0010 0.0135
Cash
Informed 0.6434 0.6453 0.6411 0.6411 0.6322 0.6211 0.6270
Learner 0.6344 0.6403 0.6398 0.6402 0.6336 0.6199 0.6254
Uninformed 0.6356 0.6293 0.6234 0.6146 0.6100 0.5997 0.6067
Enterprise Value
Informed 4.0698 4.0668 4.0570 4.0470 4.0318 4.0790 4.0715
Learner 4.0564 4.0516 4.0408 4.0300 4.0181 4.0631 4.0558
Uninformed 4.0623 4.0570 4.0429 4.0320 4.0254 4.0725 4.0638
Loss
Informed 0.0004 0.0013 0.0015 0.0015 0.0020 0.0017 0.0016
Learner 0.0004 0.0012 0.0014 0.0014 0.0018 0.0017 0.0016
Uninformed 0.0004 0.0015 0.0018 0.0019 0.0020 0.0020 0.0019
Table 3.6: Effect of learning, L-type
For L-type, this table compares the average of four metrics: the level of cash balance, the hedge,
enterprise value of the firm, and the deadweight loss across three models: ignorant, learning and
perfect knowledge, as described in Subsection 3.4.2. They are tabulated against years of learning.
The final column presents the unconditional mean of the entire simulated sample. In this table,
the size of mesh grid is 11× 31× 21× 31 (cash flow × cash holding × hedging position × beliefs).
The other parameters are given in Table 3.1.
85
Hedge
age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
Hedge Only 0.0552 0.1260 0.1694 0.1921 0.2056 0.2207 0.1990
Both 0.0657 0.1321 0.1583 0.1672 0.1646 0.1723 0.1617
Cash
Cash Only 0.2051 0.4338 0.5422 0.5929 0.6146 0.6476 0.5956
Both 0.1932 0.3809 0.4701 0.5058 0.5116 0.5343 0.4970
Enterprise Value
None 4.0053 3.9892 3.9571 3.9640 3.9717 3.9898 3.9860
Hedge Only 4.0273 4.0069 3.9632 3.9529 3.9628 3.9775 3.9791
Cash Only 4.0663 4.0543 4.0256 4.0335 4.0422 4.0618 4.0565
Both 4.0732 4.0578 4.0221 4.0234 4.0400 4.0619 4.0562
Loss
None 0.0061 0.0061 0.0059 0.0059 0.0061 0.0059 0.0060
Hedge Only 0.0059 0.0039 0.0032 0.0032 0.0030 0.0027 0.0031
Cash Only 0.0043 0.0044 0.0033 0.0029 0.0027 0.0023 0.0027
Both 0.0045 0.0022 0.0014 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0012
Table 3.7: Marginal effect of risk management tools, H-type
For H-type, this table compares the average of up to four metrics: the level of hedge, th cash balance,
the enterprise value of the firm, and the deadweight loss across four models: no risk management,
managing risk with only cash, with only hedge and with both, as described in Section 3.5. They
are tabulated against years of learning. The final column presents the unconditional mean of the
entire simulated sample. In this table, the size of mesh grid is 11× 31× 21× 31 (cash flow × cash
holding × hedging position × beliefs). The other parameters are given in Table 3.1.
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Hedge
age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
Hedge Only 0.0390 0.0863 0.0955 0.0973 0.0920 0.0896 0.0873
Both 0.0439 0.0974 0.1026 0.1041 0.0987 0.0973 0.0948
Cash
Cash Only 0.2057 0.4313 0.5410 0.5950 0.6200 0.6484 0.5964
Both 0.1995 0.4181 0.5203 0.5710 0.5894 0.6126 0.5658
Enterprise Value
None 3.9749 3.9670 3.9542 3.9551 3.9391 3.9880 3.9789
Hedge Only 3.9742 3.9528 3.9383 3.9311 3.9148 3.9763 3.9659
Cash Only 4.0365 4.0330 4.0235 4.0263 4.0114 4.0611 4.0504
Both 4.0228 4.0120 4.0165 4.0071 3.9988 4.0586 4.0442
Loss
None 0.0058 0.0059 0.0058 0.0059 0.0062 0.0059 0.0059
Hedge Only 0.0039 0.0046 0.0045 0.0049 0.0051 0.0046 0.0046
Cash Only 0.0041 0.0042 0.0033 0.0028 0.0027 0.0023 0.0026
Both 0.0026 0.0029 0.0024 0.0023 0.0022 0.0018 0.0020
Table 3.8: Marginal effect of risk management tools, L-type
For L-type, this table compares the average of up to four metrics: the level of hedge, th cash balance,
the enterprise value of the firm, and the deadweight loss across four models: no risk management,
managing risk with only cash, with only hedge and with both, as described in Section 3.5. They
are tabulated against years of learning. The final column presents the unconditional mean of the
entire simulated sample. In this table, the size of mesh grid is 11× 31× 21× 31 (cash flow × cash
holding × hedging position × beliefs). The other parameters are given in Table 3.1.
Overhang cost (A) .88 .9 .95 .97
λ (.5) None 3.7305 3.1294 2.1662 1.7965
Hedge Only 4.0706 3.4668 1.8616 1.0932
rc (0) None 4.1156 3.5301 2.3016 2.0285
Hedge Only 4.2601 3.6813 2.1962 1.7998
unlimited None 3.9459 3.3947 1.9946 1.4300
Hedge Only 5.3096 4.2185 2.8855 2.3516
Table 3.9: Value Creation
Various combinations of factors that might affect firm value are analysed in this table. Results of
Model 1 with λ = 0.5, rc = 0 and unlimited liability are tabulated against different profitabilities.
The other parameters remain the same as in Table 3.1. In each combination, we compare the firm
value of a no-risk-management firm (None) and a hedging-only firm (Hedge Only).
87
































Figure 3.1: Comparison between H and L type
This figure shows the difference in average hedge, cash stock, enterprise value and distress
probability between H-type and L-type from the perfect knowledge Model 3.
88



























Figure 3.2: Effect of model uncertainty: Average, H-type
This figure shows average hedge and cash stock in lieu of the effect of model uncertainty on
hedge and cash stock for H-type firm based on the set-up of Model 3 with learning. The
bottom panel plots corresponding belief evolution.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of model uncertainty: Average, L-type
This figure shows average hedge and cash stock in lieu of the effect of model uncertainty on
hedge and cash stock for L-type firm based on the set-up of Model 3 with learning. The
bottom panel plots corresponding belief evolution.
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Figure 3.4: Marginal effects: H-type
This figure shows a visual illustration of the average marginal effects of different risk manage-
ment tools on hedge, cash stock, and enterprise value for H-type firm based on four models:
one with no risk management at all, one with only cash balance as risk management tool,
one with only hedge, and the full model with both hedge and cash.
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Figure 3.5: Marginal effects: L-type
This figure shows a visual illustration of the average marginal effects of different risk manage-
ment tools on hedge, cash stock, and enterprise value for L-type firm based on four models:
one with no risk management at all, one with only cash balance as risk management tool,






Corporate risk management has gained a lot of of importance in the recent years,
due to increasing risk. In a global data set, Guay and Kothari (2003) find that 57%
firms around the world use derivatives. Bates et al. (2009) document a cash ratio of
23.2% in 2006, double that in 1980, for US firms. They also identify that the large
increase was mainly due to precautionary motive.
The increased importance has motivated a large number of theoretical papers
trying to explain the stylised facts and puzzles in observed corporate risk manage-
ment policy. For example, Stulz (1996) once retrospected “[t]he actual corporate
use of derivatives, however, does not seem to correspond closely to the theory ...
large companies make far greater use of derivatives than small firms, even though
small firms have more volatile cash flows, more restricted access to capital, and thus
presumably more reason to buy protection against financial trouble.” In the mean-
while, it is still in debate whether hedging creates firm value or not. Unlike what is
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predicted in most corporate risk management theories, empirical researchers, such
as Brown (2001); Guay and Kothari (2003); Jin and Jorion (2006); Magee (2009);
Bartram et al. (2011), find either non-significant firm value creation by hedging or
instead evidence of value destruction.
One potential explanation for extant literature failing to match the evidence
might be very fundamental: while they have successfully model the source of un-
certainty associated with firm’s cash flow, they did not allow for uncertainty on the
model itself. Namely, in their researches, they have made an implicit assumption
that the model is a sure thing, which might not be the case. Model uncertainty could
exist in the structure of the model, which regulates firm’s cash flow, or in the param-
eters, which govern the distributional characteristics of the cash flow produced by
the model. Our paper deals with the later type of model uncertainty, and especially
the uncertainty in firm’s profitability. We argue that for a fair evaluation on the
relative successfulness of corporate risk management policy, one should endogenise
model uncertainty and its resolution.
In this regard, this paper relates to recent literature on uncertainty in prof-
itability in the presence of certain market friction. Moyen and Platikanov (2013)
develop a dynamic Tobin’s q model, in which shareholders updates beliefs on firm’s
profitability. They find that uncertainty in profitability impacts firm’s investment
decisions, through the channel that firms with unclear profitability are more sensitive
to realised earnings than mature firms who provide clearer profitability prospects.
Although both works incorporate uncertainty in profitability in order to help us
explain subtle patterns embedded in empirical evidence, the focus of their paper is
on the impact on corporate investment policy, but we are more interested in how
firms manage their risk in the presence of uncertainty in profitability. Moreover,
they concentrate on to how firms’ policies react to instantaneous shocks, whereas
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our paper pays more attention to the evolution of firms’ policies.
More recently, De´camps et al. (2015) link uncertainty in profitability with
corporate cash management and dividend payout policy. They find that both firm’s
target cash stock level and payout ratio is increasing with profitability prospects.
This might explain the puzzle that we sometimes observe firms’ cash balance in-
crease hand in hand with their dividends. Their paper is more related to ours, as
both of us discuss how cash reserve evolves with profitability prospects. Neverthe-
less, we aim to answer a different research question: how corporate risk management
policy would be affected when firm’s profitability is also uncertain, in addition to
traditional uncertainty in firm’s cash flows.
We adopt the risk management model in Gamba and Triantis (2014). This
is a parsimonious model but has all the structural devices to accommodate our re-
search purpose. In a risk-neutral world, there are two stochastic variables, firm’s
cash flow and the price of the underlying asset of a derivative. Their evolutions are
governed by a multi-variate autoregressive process. The high/low profitability firm
(later known as H-type/L-type) has a higher/lower long-term mean in the VAR pro-
cess. All agents share the same information and could learn the type from realised
observations. As the two variables are correlated, firm thus could hedge using the
derivative, which is fairly priced taking early termination and default into account.
The firm could also retain cash, although return on internal cash is lower than the
risk free rate, indicating holding cash is costly. In each period, the firm incurs ex-
ternal financing costs upon liquidity shortfall. Default is possible as soon as equity
value drops below zero. The belief of being a high profitable firm improves over time
and the firm makes its corporate risk management decisions accordingly. We are
thus able to pay special attention to how the resolution of uncertainty affects firm’s
hedging and cash reservation policy.
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We find similar implication to De´camps et al. (2015). Both of us find that
cash could increase hand in hand with its traditionally thought competitors. Partic-
ularly, they predict dividend payout ratio, which is the speed of draining cash out
of a firm, increases with cash reserve. We add to their findings by pointing out that
hedging position, which reduces the precautionary demand of cash, also increases
with firm’s cash balance. This is due to cash’s collateral effect argued by Rampini
et al. (2014). Hedge involves liability due to promise of future payment. A collateral
would help to quickly build up desired hedging position. In our model, the only
collateral is in the from of cash. Therefore, firm would raise external capital as soon
as it can to build up cash balance and establish optimal level of hedge. A resolving
uncertainty on the profitability would relieve the provision for collateral and thus
increase both hedging position and cash stock.
This channel also leads young firms with unclear profitability to hedge less
comparing to their mature counterparts, especially for the high profitability firms.
As these firms tend to retain insufficient cash in the early stages, but increase cash
stock with higher belief of being a high profitable firm. As a result, cash’s collateral
effect drives hedging position higher. That might be able to explain why established
firms are found to use more hedge than young firms in many empirical researches.
While we observe significantly different choices in risk management tools, we
also find that the difference in firm value is relatively small, and hedge does not al-
ways increase firm value. This finding is consistent with mixed empirical evidences
aforementioned. We argue that optimal corporate risk management policy, as well
as its consequence, depends on the trade-off between minimising the convex costs by
actively managing firm’s risk and maximising the value of default option by allowing
for certain level of risk under some circumstances. We show that this could happen
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even under reasonable parameter settings.
At last, we identify both substitutionary and complementary relationship be-
tween cash and hedge, and the resolution of uncertainty in profitability enhances
substitutionary effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 states the assump-
tions and sets up our model. Section 4.3 calibrates the model and shows optimal
policies of cash holdings and hedging as the results of simulations. It also discusses
marginal effect of each risk management tool. Section 4.4 concludes and discusses
future and interesting future researches.
4.2 The Model
We build upon the structural model adopted in Chapter 3, which I paraphrase and
repeat here. A tradable security, assumed to be price X2t, is correlated with the
stochastic cash flow produced by the firm, presumed as X1t. Given this, X2t could
be written to define the perpetual swap contract with swap price s. To be specific,
under the condition of neutral-risk probability, these two variables are governed by
a joint vector autoregression (VAR) process, as following:






























where xit = logXit, τi are the long-term mean, 0 ≤ κi ≤ 1 are the persistence
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parameters, and σi > 0 are the conditional standard deviations, i = 1, 2. With-
out compromising generality, this study considers the circumstance whereby the two
state variables are in positive correlation,namely ρ ≥ 0, so that the firm would take
a long position in the swap contract.
The firm can reserve a proportion of cash flow, after paying a constant gross
cost, A, to establish a cash stock, ct. The return generated by cash, rc, is lower
than the risk-free rate, rf . The wedge between the two values accounts for various
frictions concerning holding cash. Once the cash holdings plus the cash flow are not
enough to pay for the cost A, the firm incurs costs due to external financing, which
is a proportion, λ, of the liquidity shortfall.
The uncertainty studied in this paper is about the long-term mean, τ1, of
the cash flow, which is also known as profitability. Profitability uncertainty exerts
a first order effect on corporate policies and thus speaks highly of corporate hedg-
ing behaviour. We assume the long-term mean could be either high (τH) or low (τL).
In the beginning, a firm has neutral belief on its type. It adjusts the posterior
















, i ∈ {H,L} (4.2)
ǫi =
x′i − (1− κi)τi − κixi
σi
, i ∈ {1, 2} (4.3)
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which is the bivariate standard normal probability function.
The process, x2t, regulating the underlying asset of a perpetual swap contract,
is presumed to have the same volatility and persistence as the firm’s cash flow. The
mean is assumed to be the average of high and low type, and the swap price for
a unit of product is fixed at s = 1. Later we show that these assumptions do not
affect our conclusion, because the value of swap contract is simultaneously solved
with firm value as discussed in Gamba and Triantis (2014).
Therefore, if a firm took a swap for a notional physical amount h at time t, at
t+ 1 the net payoff from the swap would be h(s−X2,t+1). Excluding counterparty
risk and contractual flexibility, the value of per unit contract at moment t,is






where Fτ (x2,t) = Et[x2,t+τ ] is the forward price at time t for delivery of the as-
set at date t+τ , and the expectation is computed under the risk-neutral probability.
If a firm’s equity value together with its current liquidity surplus could not
meet the promised payment against the swap, the firm will default on the swap. The
firm could alter its position in the swap - say from h to h′. It redeems the current
contract at the par value (St), and enters into a new agreement at market value SFt.
The net payoff from this transaction is thus h · St − h′ · SFt. Besides, considering
the proportional negotiation cost generated in each transaction, nc, there is a direct
cost of adjusting the hedge: nc · (h+ h′).
We compute the market value of the swap contract as in Gamba and Triantis
(2014). By taking credit charges into account, we preserve the no arbitrage condi-
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tion. The fair value of the contract, SFt, reflecting both default risk as well as the


















where Td is the default date and Tp is the closure of the swap position. The
event that default happens after the position in the swap is closed is indicated by
χ{Td≥Tp}, while the opposite circumstance by χ{Td<Tp}. RS(·) is the bank’s recovery
value on the swap if the firm defaults, which will be explained later. In this regard,
adjusting the swap position at a later date entails an indirect cost, h′ · SFt − h · St.
The first term in equation (3.6) is the present value of the net payoff to the
firm before rebalancing its hedge position or default. The second term is the payoff
to the bank if the firm terminates the swap or defaults. The bank is paid with par
value in the former case, or recovery value in the latter case. The fair value of the
swap contract depends on corporate policy, as Td and Tp are so determined.
Since we are interested in firms’ reaction to resolution of uncertainty, the ob-
jective is equity (firm) value maximisation and associate optimal policies. Therefore,
the value of firm is:





{qEX [V (X ′, c′, h′, q′)|H ]
+(1− q)EX [V (X ′, c′, h′, q′)|L]}}} (4.6)
where cash flow from current period is D = max{d, 0}+min{d, 0}(1 + λ), in
which the payout is
d = X1 −A + (1 + rc)c+ h(s−X2,t) + (hSt − h′SFt − nc(h+ h′))χ{h′ 6=h} − c′ (4.7)
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where χ{h′ 6=h} is the indicator function of event h
′ 6= h, and EX [·|H/L] is the
expectation conditional on the current state (X) as well as the type.
Default happens when the second argument in max is negative. All the re-
maining cash balance is paid out upon default, and the hedge position is liquidated
and settled (h = 0).
Bank’s recovery value (RS(·)) depends on the firm value at time t+ Td:
RS(X ′) = max
{
−(s−X ′2 + St),
c+ V (X ′, 0, 0, q′)
h
}
per unit of notional amount of the swap. The first argument in the max op-
erator is in fact cash inflow for the firm, if (s−X ′2 + St) > 0. The second argument
is the current cash balance plus the firm value at default, given the cash balance
is paid out, the swap contract is liquidated and settled (h = 0). For simplicity,
we do not discuss the situation where a firm can strategically default on the swap
contract in this paper. Thus any change on the assumption about what happens if
a firm defaults would have an effect on the calculation of the recovery value (RS(·)).
Firstly, the above assumption is reasonable and realistic, as the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code allows financial swaps’ counterparties to exercise contractual rights and get
paid ahead of debt obligations. Secondly, even the bankruptcy law could be dif-
ferent globally, the distinction enters the recovery value in the second argument in
terms of different level of remaining firm value. In general, a stricter bankruptcy
law with respect to swap counterparties would divert more firm value out of the firm
and thus lower the continuation value of the firm. This would in turn increases the
indirect cost of hedging and consequently reduces the use of hedge. On the contrary,
a bankruptcy law that better protects swap counterparties would encourage hedging
activity, ceteris paribus. While borrowing the tractability of the model in Gamba
101
and Triantis (2014), our model largely differs from theirs by focusing on the effect
of dynamic resolution of model uncertainty. We aim to answer a different research
question which is whether the uncertainty in profitability drives a young firm’s risk
management policy to differ from that of a mature firm. We also discard devices
that are less relevant to our research purpose, such as operational flexibility.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Parameter values
{Insert Table 4.1 here.}
We calibrate the model to suit existing empirical evidence. The rationale is
that in many cases the parameter selection corresponds to values found in the litera-
ture. In other cases, we set parameters so that moments of variables from simulations
are consistent with empirical counterparts, e.g. equity issuance frequency. The long-
run mean values for each profitability type, τH1 = 0.1 > 0 and τ
L
1 = −0.1 < 0, are
chosen such that the profitability under neutral belief of each state, τ1 = 0, which
corresponds to the long run mean profitability level assumed in Chapter 3.
The standard deviation is σ1 = 15%, and the persistence parameters of the
log of cash flow is κ1 = 0.8. Both of these are consistent with the values used in
recent articles, such as Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Gamba and Triantis (2014).
The profitability is also affected by the fixed production cost A = 0.92, which is set
to match observed frequency of equity issuance. Fama and French (2005) propose a
number between 54% to 72%, with equity issuance due to M&A and management
compensation. Adjusting for that, a more reasonable measurements range should
be between 13% and 17.9% (Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Hennessy et al., 2007;
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Gustafson and Iliev, 2015). Hennessy and Whited (2007) find that simulated fre-
quency of issuance is higher than its empirical counterpart. The simulated frequency
is 23.05%, while the observed is 17.5% in their study,.
The swap price is the median ofX2, s = 1. However, we conducted robustness
checks in a range (0.95, 1.05). Similar to Gamba and Triantis (2014), this does not
change the conclusion. This is because as long as the swap is correctly priced, the
swap price become irrelevant.
In our model, X1 is the source of risk exposure of our firm, and the corre-
lation ρ represents the ability to hedge this risk exposure using the swap contract.
We believe that this correlation could to be low for non-financial corporations, in a
range between 3% and 45% from Tufano (1996), Guay and Kothari (2003), Bartram
et al. (2010) and Campello et al. (2011). It could also be very high for firms relate
to natural resource, agriculture and finance, e.g. Carter et al. (2006) and Rampini
et al. (2014). To serve the purpose of this paper, we focus on the later case in which
high correlation coefficient guarantees meaningful hedging demand.
The risk free rate is assumed at 5%, while return on cash is 3.7%. In other
words, the cost of carrying cash is r − rc = 1.3% inside the firm. The existing two
main concerns on holding cash are: the loss of interest tax; and the opportunity
cost of forgoing positive NPV investments. Morellec et al. (2014) assume the cost
is 2%, which replicates empirically consistent simulation results. We use a smaller
one, (1.3%), as it yields better cash ratio as in Sa´nchez and Yurdagul (2013) under
our model setting.
When a firm is in distress, the distress cost is assumed to be proportional,
(λ), to the deficit amount, which is assumed at 15%. This may reflect a discount
103
in fire sales, or to costly covenants in contracts for external capital. Pulvino (1998)
provides the fire-sale discount at 14%. Strebulaev (2007) set the range of distress
cost is between 5− 25%, with a mid-point at 15%. Our 15% assumption is close to
them. Most of the above parameters have been examined in Gamba and Triantis
(2014).
4.3.2 Numerical solution and simulation
In this paper, the uncertainty regards the most important distributional characteris-
tics, the long-term mean, of the cash flow. Particularly, this incomplete information
determines how well a firm performs, also known as profitability. At the beginning,
the firm has neutral priors on having high or low profitability. The firm updates its
belief following Bayes’ rule, by observing the realizations of the state variables.
Interested in the effect of uncertainty in profitability on the dynamics of cor-
porate policies and the value of firm, in this subsection, we show how the optimal
policy function, found by solving the firm’s problem in Section 4.2, drives the dynam-
ics of corporate risk management policy. Further details could be found in Appendix
A about the numerical method.
Baseline models
{Insert Table 4.2 here.}
Similar to Chapter 3, in order to have a clear reference, we set off from several
baseline models. In Model 1, firms have perfect information, no cash reserve, with
perfectly correlated cash flows with hedging asset. We then gradually relax one re-
striction of these factors that might affect corporate risk management policy, so that
we will have a clean view on the individual effect of each aspect of the model. In
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Model 2 we allow for a imperfect correlation between the underlying asset of swap
and cash flow of firm. In Model 3, we introduce an alternative risk management
tool, cash balance.
The results are presented in Table 4.2. In addition to traditional metrics,
such as hedge position, cash balance (if allowed), firm value (enterprise value when
cash is introduced), and equity issuance frequency, we report the frequency of equity
issuance caused by cash flow shortfall separately. This is the passive equity issuance,
denoted as ’Distress’ in Table 4.2, which is due to either a negative shock to firm’s
cash flow or insufficient risk management decision made in the previous period. This
separation helps us to probe the relationship between risk management and external
financing probability in a more strategic perspective. On one hand, firms resort to
external finance in the face of financial distress. On the other hand, firms might
be willing to raise external finance, even in good states with no operating cash flow
shortfall, to meet the liquidity need in hard time so as to establish an optimal risk
management position. This decomposition, as indicated in Table 4.2, shows that a
considerable proportion of aggregate external financing is caused by voluntary eq-
uity issuance, due to liquidity need so as to fulfill the risk management decision in
current period, to establish optimal hedging position. Here we only present steady-
state value of each metric. However, we notice that it takes some time to reach the
steady state from an initial condition, especially when cash holding is allowed. We
will investigate the evolution in later paragraphs.
Indicated by the comparison between the first and second column of Table
4.2, a high profitability firm would increase the use of hedge to maintain the fre-
quency of cash flow shortfall, and to prevent a significant drop in firm value, when
the correlation becomes imperfect, specifically from 1 to 0.9. Since in Model 2 the
underlying asset of swap mismatches firm’s cash flow at a positive probability, hedg-
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ing associates with additional costs. Consequently, the firm reduces voluntary equity
issuance, leading to a higher hedging position but more passive adjustment to the
hedging position. This is consistent with traditional risk management theory, indi-
cating that risk management consideration dominates firm’s use of hedge.
We further include cash reserve in Model 3 as in the third column, with the
correlation coefficient unchanged at ρ = 0.9. Firms stock substantial amount of cash
and reduce hedging activity. This indicates a substitutionary effect between hedge
and cash. Firms equipped with cash as an alternative risk management tool are
able to reduce their distress probability further, as well as the total external equity
issuance rate. Consequently, enterprise value is enhanced.
As discussed in the beginning, we note that although frequency of external
financing is the only observable variable in real world, we are more interested in
the decomposition of total equity issuance for different purposes. More importantly,
we note that this effect differs across all three models in Table 4.2. The proportion
increases when the correlation between firms’ cash flow and underlying asset of swap
becomes imperfect, and decreases with the ability to reserve cash. Specifically, the
frequency of actual distress in Model 3, as a result of operation, decreased to as low
as 0.77%.
Therefore, one interesting implication is that rather than gross external fi-
nancing frequency, which we usually observe in real world and is widely used in em-
pirical studies, researchers should distinguish actual financial distress from voluntary
equity issuance. We suggest empirical researchers to use more subtle identification
of external financing when studying corporate policy. Some pioneering works are
already heading for this direction. For example, DeAngelo et al. (2010) find that
62.6% issuers of SEO would have run out of cash the year after SEO without the
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proceeds from SEO.
{Insert Table 4.3 here.}
As indicated in Table 4.3, low profitability firms have distinct risk manage-
ment policy. By construction, since low profitability firms are more likely to incur
liquidity shortfall and bankruptcy, they have higher hedging demand. When hedging
is a perfect risk management tool, firms take almost full hedging position as predicted
by classic corporate risk management theory. Nevertheless, the policy changes dra-
matically when hedging becomes imperfect. Particularly, even a firm in good state
(when X1 is high) could still fall into financial distress if the underlying asset of the
swap is in better state (when X2 > X1). L-type firms use little hedging, resulting
a much higher possibility of distress and external equity issuance. The default rate
also triples comparing to perfect correlation scenario. These behaviour indicate that
firms are seeking risk, to certain extent, to maximize the value of default option -
risk-shifting issue dominates. Although long neglected, this is not surprising, be-
cause limited liability serves as a natural risk management device and reduces the
use of other risk management tools. This value enhancement comes from the option
that limited liability firms can default in bad states, hoping a larger prospect in good
states. Since the downside is bounded but not the upside, in expectation firm value
is larger than the value of firm, who has to bear all the losses even when the firm is
a negative asset.
A similar substitutionary relationship between hedge and cash exhibits when
cash reserve is possible. Since the frequency of both equity issuance and distress
drops, the introduction of cash in fact restores some consideration towards tradi-
tional corporate risk management. This might be because now firms have more, the
reserved cash, to lose upon bankruptcy. As a result, the default rate drops by half
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and firms live longer.
{Insert Table 4.4 here.}
{Insert Figure 4.1 here.}
We probe further some important dynamics not illustrated in Table 4.2, as
well as compare High type with Low type. As shown in Table 4.4, we note an in-
creasing pattern in cash stock in L types. Since there is no model uncertainty yet,
this dynamics is possibly due to the physical ability to accumulate cash. Particu-
larly, the mean of operating profit, E(X˜L1 ) − A, is 0.0136 per period. To establish
the optimal cash balance, which is about 0.1672 for L type, it takes time.
In the meanwhile, when we allow for a cash balance, a firm is able to smooth
the cost of risk management over time. The firm could issue equity as soon as it can,
and stores the proceedings as cash in the firm, as long as it is still cost-beneficial.
The costs associated with holding cash is 1.3%, which is consistent with literature.
To address this concern, later we will endow the firm with the steady-state cash
balance, so as to adjust for this dynamic pattern not caused by learning when we
comment on the effect of learning. In addition, we conduct sensitivity analysis on
the carrying cost of cash, and find results remain in a reasonable range of the cost.
Furthermore, we observe distinct strategy between H-type and L-type firms.
H-type uses more hedge to manage its operating risk. On the contrary, classic cor-
porate risk management theory predicts that L-type firms should benefit more from
hedging, as L-type firms are more often to fall into financial distress and trigger
external financing cost which could be mitigated by risk management. However, we
find that L-type firms use a lower level of hedge. In the next section, we illustrate
that this is reasonable when the profitability is so low that the option value outruns
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the value created by risk management by comparing both types to a moderate prof-
itability firm. As a result, we note a much lower distress probability for H-type. For
both types, the total effect from corporate risk management is enhanced, evidenced
by a declining frequency of distress.
Effect of model uncertainty
To separate the effect due to model uncertainty, we compare the results from the
full model, with model uncertainty, with those from the benchmark model, Model 3,
with no model uncertainty. Moreover, we include an additional model where a firm
has a known profitability equal to the expected level under neutral belief, i.e. τ1 = 0,
to further illustrate the effects of parameter uncertainty. We name this the expected
model. For a fair comparison, we grant firms steady-state cash as an endowment.
{Insert Figure 4.2 here.}
Figure 4.2 summarises and helps us to understand the main message of this
section. Firstly, similar to De´camps et al. (2015), we find that cash balance increases
(decreases) with higher (lower) belief of being a high profitability firm.
Secondly, we observe that the use of hedge also increases with the belief of
being a high profitability firm, thus hedging is increasing with cash reserve. Rampini
et al. (2014) explain this phenomenon by cash’s collateral effect. As discussed in the
previous paragraph, if the carrying cost is low, firms would prefer issuing equity as
soon as possible and storing the raised capital as cash. Firms can thus afford more
hedging because they have more collateral represented by cash holdings, which is
the only tangible asset of the firm in our model. Therefore, the observed pattern
is determined by the trade-off between a complementary effect of cash, serving as
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collateral so as to afford more hedging, and a substitution effect, when the cost of
holding cash is large.
We argue that the collateral consideration might be enhanced in the presence
of uncertainty in profitability. In De´camps et al. (2015), cash reserve and dividend
compete for limited cash flow generated by the firm. They find that a higher belief
of being a high profitability firm relieves the competition thus lead both of them to
increase simultaneously. In our paper, the tension lies in the relationship between
cash reserve and hedging. Similar to De´camps et al. (2015), we find that firm’s
hedging position increases with higher belief of being a high profitability firm even
when the cash is not increasing.
Particularly, we find a learning H-type firm generally uses more hedge than
its first best counterpart. However, although storing less cash than it would do in
the first best scenario, the H-type firm increases its cash balance over time. This
co-movement supports that model uncertainty works in the direction of increasing
complementarity effect between risk management tools, as a higher cash reserve
would otherwise result in lower hedging if it worked in favour of substitutionary.
In the meanwhile, the complementary effect is also indicated by a lagged
hedging with respect to cash reserve. As in Figure 4.2, cash grows from the endowed
level in the second year, whereas hedging picks up in the third year. After setting
hedging off, cash balance decreases to the original level and then increases with the
belief of being a high profitability firm. This indicates that a substantial level of cash
stock is optimal to start hedging, as predicted by Rampini et al. (2014). However,
this effect does not rely on model uncertainty. As in Figure 4.2, both of the models
exhibit the same complementary effect in the first few years.
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{Insert Figure 4.3 here.}
The opposite pattern is documented for the L-type as in Figure 4.3. Rather
than learning H-type firms, who uses more hedge but less cash, learning L-type firms
instead assume less hedge and more cash. Therefore, as we have observed in learning
H-type scenario, there is a co-movement in the combination of hedge and cash for
a learning L-type firm with respect to its perfect knowledge counterpart. Again, we
document the model-uncertainty-independent complementarity in the first few years
in all models as in the H-type scenario. Interestingly, we also find that when a firm
has a know level of profitability, which equals to the expected level of neutral belief,
it would use more hedge and more cash comparing to both a learning H-type firm
and a learning L-type firm. As a firm with lower profitability than the H-type, it
has more risks to manage thus creates more value from risk management. It makes
sense for the firm to use more hedge as well as reserve more cash. Comparing to
a L-type firm with even lower profitability, the value created by risk management
outruns the option value of default. Therefore, a firm with moderate profitability
could use more hedge and cash than both H-type and L-type firms. Note that unlike
what we find in Chapter 3, the evolutions of hedge and cash do not converge to first
best counterparts, indicating the path-dependency is stronger when the uncertainty
is on the first order moment.
{Insert Table 4.5 here.}
We tabulate the evolutions in Table 4.5. When model uncertainty is inte-
grated into the model, the H-type continuously increases its hedge when knowledge
is largely improved, and results in a higher hedging position in the long-run. In con-
trast, L-type uses much less hedge. Since upon maturity the H-type firms take on
more hedge, it is consistent with our previous claim that a firm with better knowl-
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edge about the profitability of its business will prefer actively managing its risk to
maximizing default option value.
This is intuitively reasonable because mature firms have learned their prof-
itability through many years of operation, and thus have clearer picture on th trade-
off relationship as well as keep hedging cost low. In addition, the accumulation of
wealth gives them more to lose upon bankruptcy. This interpretation answers to
Stulz (1996), where he retrospected “[t]he actual corporate use of derivatives, how-
ever, does not seem to correspond closely to the theory ... large companies make
far greater use of derivatives than small firms, even though small firms have more
volatile cash flows, more restricted access to capital, and thus presumably more rea-
son to buy protection against financial trouble.”
Thus we conclude that the above features stand out from extant literature as
they raise distinct predictions of uncertainty in profitability: both corporate hedging
position and cash reserve increase with the belief of being a high profitability firm;
high profitability firm uses more hedge as risk management consideration dominates
maximisation of default option value; cash’s role in corporate risk management is
more sophisticated than it is studied in previous literature. This separation might
be the reason for mixed empirical findings, if they do not control for knowledge
accumulation of firms.
Marginal effect of individual risk management tool
In this section, we explore the marginal effect of each risk management tool. We
study three models: one with no risk management at all, one with only cash reserve
as risk management tool, and the last with only hedge using derivatives defined
in Section 4.2. Together with the full model with both hedge and cash analysed in
Subsection 4.3.2, we can quantify marginal effect of individual risk management tool
112
when uncertainty in profitability is gradually resolved.
Cash, as one of the main interests in this paper, might be one of the most
subtle variables in corporate risk management. The firm actively changes its cash
balance level. Decreases in cash balance usually occur if the firm draws on internal
liquidity to overcome low profitability, and if the firm builds up a hedging position.
Especially in the most extreme case, a total loss of cash occurs upon bankruptcy.
Increases in cash balance enable the firm to weather negative cash flow shocks, as
well as to provide additional liquidity for future establishment of hedge, particularly
if the cash balance has been drawn down. Although result shows that the cash stock
remains substantial even if the cash flow and price of underlying asset of hedging
derivatives is almost perfectly correlated - ρ is as high as 0.9, indicating cash hold-
ing is an indispensable method of corporate risk management, there are important
limitations. First, there is a cost associated with holding cash. Second, persistent
unfavourable states will gradually deplete the firm’s cash stock, even if it was sub-
stantial. Distress costs will then be triggered with some probability. Vice versa: to
build up a large cash balance, it requires the firm to either yield a sufficient string
of positive cash flows or raise costly external finance, which might not be the case.
Having analysed the cases in which cash stock is beneficial/costly, we might be able
to explain: why firms store more cash in case of need in bad states of world, given
hedging effect could be very noisy due to imperfect knowledge in the early stage.
{Insert Figure 4.4, 4.5 and Table 4.6, 4.7 here.}
As illustrated by Figure 4.4 and 4.5 with details in Table 4.6 and 4.7, firms
tend to use more hedge (cash) when this is the only risk managing method. This
implies that the substitutionary effect dominates in both types. As we have learnt
from previous subsection, having access to hedging relieve both types’ cash demand,
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indicating hedging substitutes cash stock in the presence of uncertainty in profitabil-
ity, and vice versa.
We present an interesting finding of this subsection. Our result might shed
light on the mixed empirical evidence on value creation of hedging. Under our main
parameter settings, as in Table 4.1, hedging by itself seems not to increase firm value
for both H and L type firms, as illustrated in the third panel of Figure 4.4 and 4.5.
However, together with cash reserve, firm value are enhanced in both cases. More
interestingly, the major difference lies in their choices of corporate risk management
strategies due to distinct profitability, as H-type firms hedge substantially more than
their L-type peers, as well as holding more cash. This is consistent with empirical
researches that find no evidence for hedging creating firm value.
In the end, while optimal corporate risk management policy of the L type
firms indeed reduces costs of external financing as indicated by lowering distress
probability, it does not significantly reduce default risk. In other words, the optimal
corporate risk management policy should minimise the costs of external financing
costs and maintain the value of default option in the meanwhile.
4.4 Conclusion and Future Research
In a dynamic model, we find that a firm’s risk management policy could be largely
affected by uncertainty in profitability, as its resolution process intertwines with the
combined action of two trade-offs which forms corporate risk management policy.
In the first trade-off relationship, the firm balances the costs of managing risk and
the benefits from mitigating external financing costs. Even though the benefits out-
weighs the costs, whether the firm actively manages its risk depend on the result of
the second tension, in which the firm balances the value created by risk management
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and the value lost in decreased default option. We find that both cash balance and
hedging level increase with the belief of being a high profitability firm. Moreover,
default option value maximisation dominates risk management consideration in less
profitable firms. These implications might explain the puzzle of young firms con-
duct less hedge than mature firms, and mitigate the ongoing debate over whether
corporate risk management create firm value or not. This paper also lends support
to the empirical evidence documented by Rampini et al. (2014), where they find a
dramatic decrease, from 30% to less than 5% of estimated annual fuel expenses of
airlines, in risk management. The results of our model warrant a reconsideration of
the interpretation of the findings in the past empirical literature, especially in those
involve time series analysis. Moyen and Platikanov (2013) succeed in using age as a
proxy for the resolution of uncertainty, and identify a link to the dynamics of corpo-
rate investment. We expect a similar success in studying the dynamics of corporate
risk management. Although this paper does not touch the strategic entering into a
new market, it is interesting to further probe the idea that an entering firm could
learn from observing the current operational results of in-place firms. An educated
guess would be that the information from peers’ operation could constantly raise (or
lower) the prior belief on the profitability of its own. The firm thus might decide
the optimal timing of entry and default accordingly.
4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Appendix:Numerical Methods
We adopt the numerical methods in Chapter 3, which we repeat here, but adapt
that to our particular research interest in uncertainty about profitability. We solve
the Bellman equation described in Section 4.2 by simulating 1,000 firms over 50
years. Each path for the state variable x is obtained by iterating Equation (4.1)
using Monte Carlo simulation, for 50 time steps. The simulated paths for x are
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restricted to a set of discrete values x˜, following Tauchen (1986) approach. Due to
the curse of dimensionality, the number of sampling points is chosen to be 11 as a
result of trade-off between accuracy and efficiency. However, we run special tests to
guarantee this choice of grid size yields simulation results with errors in the relevant
moments (mean, volatility and correlation) that are within 1% of their theoretical
counterparts. For robustness, we also have a finer grid and find very similar results.
Particularly, we discretise the sets of h, c and q respectively in [0, hu], [0, cu]
and [0, 1] with 31 equally spaced points. Variable x1 and x2 define a reduced-form
vector autoregression that we approximate through a discrete-state Markov chain
with 11 points for each variable with truncated support in [τL1 − 3σuj , τH1 + 3σuj ],
j = 1, 2, where σuj = σj/
√
1− κ2 is the unconditional standard deviation for j = 1, 2.
The discrete abscissae and the risk-neutral Markov transition probabilities are com-
puted according to the method proposed by Terry and Knotek (2011), which is based
on the Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule, as in Tauchen (1986), but allows for non-zero
correlation.
A Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate a sample path for the firm
following an optimal policy. We generate a sequence of 500,000 independent draws
from a truncated bivariate Normal distribution and generated a path for x1 and
x2 using the AR(1) specification. Starting from an initial condition (h0, c0, q0), we
apply the optimal policy from the Equation 4.6 and generate a simulated path for
the firm. We drop the first 200 observations, to exclude any influence of the initial
condition. In the event the firm defaults, a new firm starts business with neutral
belief and with no financial hedging in place (h = 0, c = 0).
4.5.2 Appendix:Figures and Tables
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τH1 long-term mean of high type 0.1
τL1 long-term mean of high type −0.1
τ2 long-term mean of underlying asset of swap 0
σ annual volatility of x 15%
ρ correlation between firm’s cash flow and underlying asset 0.9
κ persistence of x 0.8
s swap price of the swap contract 1
A fixed production cost 0.92
rf annual risk-free rate 5%
rc return on cash 3.7%
λ distress cost 15%
rc renegotiation cost 1%
Table 4.1: Parameter Values
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Hedge 0.0524 0.2532 0.1750
Cash NaN NaN 0.2636
EV 5.7535 5.7234 5.8819
Equity Issue 0.2146 0.1729 0.0161
Distress 0.1462 0.1481 0.0077
Default 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4.2: Simulation results of baseline models, H-type
Each column in this table presents the average of up to seven metrics
from 3 baseline models based on H-type firms, with one restriction
relaxed at each time. The metrics are: the level of hedge; the cash
balance; the firm/enterprise value of the firm; the frequency of exter-
nal equity financing, financial distress; and proportion of defaulted
firms. Model 1 is the baseline model with perfect knowledge, no cash
and perfect correlation; in Model 2, firms’ cash flows become imper-
fectly correlated; and finally Model 3 adds cash as an alternative risk
management tool. In this table, size of mesh grid is 11×31×21 (cash
flow × hedging position × cash holding). The other parameters are
given in Table 3.1.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Hedge 0.9809 0.0456 0.0371
Cash NaN NaN 0.1672
EV 2.3486 1.1387 1.0714
Equity Issue 0.0172 0.3630 0.2431
Distress 0.0145 0.3267 0.2121
Default 0.0236 0.0618 0.0378
Table 4.3: Simulation results of baseline models, L-type
Each column in this table presents the average of up to seven metrics
from 3 baseline models based on L-type firms, with one restriction
relaxed at each time. The metrics are: the level of hedge; the cash
balance; the firm/enterprise value of the firm; the frequency of exter-
nal equity financing, financial distress; and proportion of defaulted
firms. Model 1 is the baseline model with perfect knowledge, no cash
and perfect correlation; in Model 2, firms’ cash flows become imper-
fectly correlated; and finally Model 3 adds cash as an alternative risk
management tool. In this table, size of mesh grid is 11×31×21 (cash
flow × hedging position × cash holding). The other parameters are
given in Table 3.1.
age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
H type
Hedge 0.0139 0.0793 0.1077 0.1264 0.1416 0.1707 0.1472
Cash 0.2374 0.2242 0.2411 0.2476 0.2549 0.2593 0.2537
EV 5.9054 5.9129 5.8860 5.8856 5.8751 5.9031 5.9000
Equity Issue 0.0433 0.0187 0.0153 0.0143 0.0173 0.0158 0.0176
Distress 0.0310 0.0077 0.0053 0.0080 0.0093 0.0074 0.0089
Default 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
L type
Hedge 0.0132 0.0302 0.0267 0.0267 0.0267 0.0346 0.0316
Cash 0.0924 0.1470 0.1568 0.1627 0.1627 0.1673 0.1603
EV 1.0257 1.0365 1.0277 1.0499 1.0404 1.0742 1.0625
Equity Issue 0.3809 0.2926 0.2891 0.2629 0.2782 0.2465 0.2631
Distress 0.3415 0.2621 0.2539 0.2310 0.2447 0.2148 0.2306
Default 0.0621 0.0343 0.0335 0.0372 0.0442 0.0379 0.0392
Table 4.4: H vs L, with cash, no model uncertainty
For Model 3, this table presents the evolution of the average of six metrics: the level of hedge; the
cash balance; the firm/enterprise value of the firm; the frequency of external equity financing; and
the frequency of financial distress. They are tabulated against years, with each column reports the
average metrics during the corresponding years. The final column presents the unconditional mean
of the entire simulated sample. In this table, the size of mesh grid is 11× 31× 21× 31 (cash flow ×




age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
Informed 0.0108 0.0465 0.0419 0.0479 0.0522 0.0606 0.0543
Learner 0.0114 0.0656 0.1061 0.1468 0.1687 0.2025 0.1710
Uninformed 0.0957 0.1607 0.1901 0.2132 0.2302 0.2881 0.2544
Belief 0.7561 0.8415 0.8927 0.9285 0.9571 0.9947 0.9581
L type
age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
Informed 0.0117 0.0349 0.0338 0.0349 0.0371 0.0423 0.0387
Learner 0.0088 0.0294 0.0218 0.0183 0.0194 0.0152 0.0165
Uninformed 0.0913 0.1373 0.1436 0.1414 0.1332 0.1523 0.1453
Belief 0.2786 0.2179 0.1609 0.1140 0.0710 0.0102 0.0587
Panel B: Cash
H type
Informed 0.2718 0.2997 0.3089 0.3068 0.2955 0.2985 0.2979
Learner 0.2232 0.2067 0.2277 0.2346 0.2457 0.2671 0.2550
Uninformed 0.4787 0.7195 0.8016 0.8292 0.8417 0.8504 0.8148
L type
Informed 0.1493 0.1543 0.1492 0.1564 0.1510 0.1603 0.1577
Learner 0.2068 0.2093 0.1935 0.1930 0.1786 0.1651 0.1747
Uninformed 0.3456 0.3918 0.3987 0.3911 0.3765 0.4329 0.4170
Table 4.5: Effect of learning
For both types, this table compares the average of four metrics: the level of cash balance, the
hedge; and the enterprise value of the firm across three models: ignorant, learning and perfect
knowledge, as described in Subsection 3.4.2. They are tabulated against years of learning. The
final column presents the unconditional mean of the entire simulated sample. In this table, the size
of mesh grid is 11 × 31 × 21 × 31 (cash flow × cash holding × hedging position × beliefs). The
other parameters are given in Table 3.1.
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Hedge
age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
Hedge Only 0.0893 0.2005 0.2435 0.2591 0.2574 0.2571 0.2427
Both 0.0114 0.0656 0.1061 0.1468 0.1687 0.2025 0.1710
Cash
Cash Only 0.2210 0.5600 0.6917 0.7480 0.7730 0.7631 0.7128
Both 0.2232 0.2067 0.2277 0.2346 0.2457 0.2671 0.2550
Enterprise Value
None 4.7948 5.1320 5.3153 5.5152 5.6289 5.7887 5.6321
Hedge Only 4.8070 5.1274 5.2961 5.4693 5.5985 5.7502 5.6000
Cash Only 4.8538 5.1989 5.3864 5.5884 5.7039 5.8645 5.7058
Both 4.8896 5.2442 5.4284 5.6244 5.7345 5.8784 5.7271
Table 4.6: Marginal effect of risk management tools, H-type
For H-type, this table compares the average of up to four metrics: the level of hedge, th cash
balance, and the enterprise value of the firm across four models: no risk management, managing
risk with only cash, with only hedge and with both, as described in Section 3.4.2. They are
tabulated against years of learning. The final column presents the unconditional mean of the
entire simulated sample. In this table, the size of mesh grid is 11× 31× 21× 31 (cash flow × cash
holding × hedging position × beliefs). The other parameters are given in Table 3.1.
Hedge
age 2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-50 2-50
Hedge Only 0.0518 0.1238 0.1272 0.1053 0.0907 0.0414 0.0593
Both 0.0088 0.0294 0.0218 0.0183 0.0194 0.0152 0.0165
Cash
Cash Only 0.1192 0.2708 0.3150 0.3100 0.2807 0.1813 0.2051
Both 0.2068 0.2093 0.1935 0.1930 0.1786 0.1651 0.1747
Enterprise Value
None 2.0408 1.8103 1.5998 1.3984 1.2357 1.1544 1.2960
Hedge Only 2.0557 1.8096 1.5905 1.4055 1.2367 1.1569 1.2986
Cash Only 2.0759 1.8367 1.6087 1.4098 1.2325 1.1024 1.2647
Both 2.0440 1.8606 1.6588 1.4761 1.2726 1.1415 1.3010
Table 4.7: Marginal effect of risk management tools, L-type
For L-type, this table compares the average of up to four metrics: the level of hedge, th cash balance,
and the enterprise value of the firm across four models: no risk management, managing risk with
only cash, with only hedge and with both, as described in Section 3.4.2. They are tabulated against
years of learning. The final column presents the unconditional mean of the entire simulated sample.
In this table, the size of mesh grid is 11×31×21×31 (cash flow × cash holding × hedging position
× beliefs). The other parameters are given in Table 3.1.
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Figure 4.1: Comparison between H and L type
This figure shows the difference in average hedge, cash stock, enterprise value and distress
probability between H-type and L-type from the perfect knowledge Model 3.
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Figure 4.2: Effect of model uncertainty: Average, H-type
This figure shows average hedge and cash stock in lieu of the effect of model uncertainty on
hedge and cash stock for learning H-type firm based on the set-up of Model 3. The bottom
panel plots corresponding belief evolution.
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Figure 4.3: Effect of model uncertainty: Average, L-type
This figure shows average hedge and cash stock in lieu of the effect of model uncertainty on
hedge and cash stock for learning L-type firm based on the set-up of Model 3. The bottom
panel plots corresponding belief evolution.
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Figure 4.4: Marginal effects: H-type
This figure shows a visual illustration of the average marginal effects of different risk manage-
ment tools on hedge, cash stock, and enterprise value for H-type firm based on four models:
one with no risk management at all, one with only cash balance as risk management tool,
one with only hedge, and the full model with both hedge and cash.
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Figure 4.5: Marginal effects: L-type
This figure shows a visual illustration of the average marginal effects of different risk manage-
ment tools on hedge, cash stock, and enterprise value for L-type firm based on four models:
one with no risk management at all, one with only cash balance as risk management tool,




The thesis presents discussion concerning corporate financing decisions, corporate
risk management policy under uncertainty. The uncertainty underlies the charac-
teristics of a firm - the riskiness of a firm, the hedgeability of a firm’s cash flow with
hedging asset, or the profitability of a firm.
The main contribution of Chapter 2 is to explore why firms prefer equity
issuance in the bull market and debt in the bear market. Overall, I find different
equilibria in different market conditions under Prospect Theory preference. In the
bull market, risky and safe type of firms pool together to exploit over-valuation on
their projects, whilst in the bear market, different type of firm separate from each
other in order not to upset investors further. The result leads to bias in investment
budgeting, as positive NPV projects might be foregone in the bear market and neg-
ative NPV projects might be undertaken in the bull market condition. Moreover,
the bias would be finally corrected upon realisation of information on the projects,
leading to a drastic price correction which we usually observe in a financial crisis.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focus more on the model uncertainty. Both of them
conclude that model uncertainty and its resolution dynamically alters firms’ risk
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management strategies thus should draw attention when studying firms’ optimal
policies. However, they aim to answer specific research questions, and relates to dif-
ferent strands of literature. Chapter 3 studies the case in which firms with hedging
demand have limited knowledge on the hedgeability - the correlation between their
cash flows and hedging assets. However, they could learn from observed realisations
of both the cash flow and the price of the underlying asset of a derivative used for
hedging. We find that resolution of this uncertainty (on the hedgeability) drives the
level of corporate hedging. This might explain the puzzling empirical evidence that
young firms hedge less than mature ones, while conventional corporate risk manage-
ment theory predicts the opposite. We also find that hedge and cash, both as risk
management tool, substitute and complement each other at the same time. More-
over, we provide support to mixed evidence on the value creation role of hedging, as
we observe smaller difference in firm value comparing to the difference in corporate
risk management policy under reasonable assumptions.
Chapter 4 relates closely to a trending literature on uncertainty in profitabil-
ity. We identify similar pattern of a relieved tension between cash reserve and liquid-
ity demand with those literature discussed in Chapter 4. Particularly, we find that
both cash stock and hedging position increases with resolved profitability prospects.
However, low profitable firms’ risk management policy largely differs from that of
high profitable firms. We find that this difference results from a trade-off between
maximising value brought by risk management and maximising the value of a de-
fault option. Again we identify both substitutionary effect and complementary effect
between cash balance and hedging. However, we emphasize that uncertainty in prof-
itability actually enhance the substitutionary effect.
Findings in this thesis shed lights upon many open research questions. Its en-
lightenment could inspire many interesting future research on diverse topics. Planned
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future research focuses on the implication of Chapter 2. The signaling effect in the
choice of financing method in bull and bear market is ready for test. Chapter 3
and 4 invites future empirical studies to take information acquisition into account.
Gladly, pioneer research has already been heading to this direction, e.g. using age
as a proxy for the resolution of uncertainty, Moyen and Platikanov (2013) succeed
in explaining the dynamics of corporate investment that could not be understood
by conventional theories. I expect similar successes in other topics.
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